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ABSTRACT
CAMPOCHIARO, OLIVIA JANE Denying Refuge, Creating an Industry:
Migrant Smuggling and the Human Cost of the Turkey-European Union Asylum
Framework. Department of Political Science, March 2018.
ADVISOR: Cigdem Çidam, PhD
This thesis examines how state responses to irregular migration impact human
smuggling activity and the experiences of asylum seekers in Turkey and the European
Union within the context of the current refugee crisis. To do so, I first discuss relevant
global and regional policy frameworks regarding border security, human smuggling, and
the rights of displaced people. I then embark on a case study of the Eastern
Mediterranean Migration Corridor from Middle Eastern and North African states through
Turkey to the Schengen Zone, a primary irregular pathway for migrants seeking asylum
in the EU. Turkey hosts more internationally displaced people than any other country in
the world, but most do not wish to stay. While the many limitations of Turkey’s
migration and asylum framework push transit migration, restrictive border policies
incentivize migrants to seek out human smugglers. Smuggling has immense human costs:
over fifteen thousand irregular migrants have died on the Mediterranean since 2014 and
this trend shows no signs of stopping. I investigate the broader implications of this
phenomenon and provide policy suggestions to better prepare states to receive and protect
displaced people. I conclude by arguing that if states wish to stop irregular migration and
human smuggling, demand must be eliminated by adopting less militarized responses and
providing access to timely, regular channels to claim asylum.

v

I. INTRODUCTION
Within the first three months of 2017, 30,465 migrants entered Europe. 29,260
arrivals were by sea. While these numbers show a 97 percent decrease compared to the
first quarter of 2016, Italy has experienced an 85 percent increase in arrivals.1 Although
EU states have taken drastic measures to strengthen border security, they have not
necessarily curbed migration through irregular channels. Rather, there has been a
geographical and methodological shift in migration, a direct response to the imposition of
new barriers to movement. Multiple terrorist attacks in European cities have taken place
during this time of unprecedented migration from North Africa and the Middle East.
These simultaneous phenomena contribute to increasingly xenophobic sentiments and
irrational perspectives of migrant criminality, despite the fact that most migrants
relocating to Europe have suffered immeasurable terror, violence and insecurity in their
own countries. Nevertheless, feeling personally inconvenienced by such population
influxes, decision makers have shifted their political priorities from protecting human
rights to sealing external borders and improving the ability to identify, monitor, and
control populations.
Perhaps most significant is the sheer amount of people entering Europe by boat on
one of the dangerous Mediterranean Sea routes: 96 percent of migrants arrived this way,
demonstrating the high degree of desperation to enter the region as natural and manmade
crises force people from their homes. Borders are becoming increasingly impermeable
and migrants are encouraged to seek out alternative routes that are dangerous and
expensive to cross. Lack of legal and safe channels motivate migrants to employ
1

International Organization for Migration. "Tracks deaths of migrants, including refugees," Missing
Migrants Project.
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professional, clandestine agents, frequently referred to as ‘human smugglers’ or ‘migrant
smugglers’ that assist them in completing their journey for a price.
In this chapter I begin with an exploration of the definition of human smuggling
and its distinction from the related concept of trafficking. I then investigate the three
primary driving forces of irregular migration: globalization, global crises and the
increasingly restrictive immigration policies of destination states in response to
unprecedented population movement. Migration and human smuggling, as well as the
policy responses to these trends, are closely linked. However, for analytical purposes I
examine these phenomena separately, first looking at the rise of irregular migration and
state responses to this trend, then at the ways in which the increase in global migrants and
the way states respond to their movement contribute to the growth of the human
smuggling industry. This analysis brings me to the conclusion that state policies - both
those that target smuggling and those that target irregular migration- have a direct impact
on the human smuggling industry in a way that is counterintuitive to policymakers’
intentions. I finish this chapter by bringing to light the human costs associated with
human smuggling, as well as the limitations to researching this clandestine industry.

A. WHAT IS MIGRANT SMUGGLING?

Human smuggling, also referred to as migrant smuggling, arises as a central issue
within the context of irregular or “illegal” migration. Irregular migration refers to any sort
of movement across borders that circumvents state regulatory norms, including passing
with false documents or at unauthorized checkpoints, overstaying one’s visa, or making
false claims to asylum. Human smuggling, which exists under the broader classification

2

of irregular migration, can be defined as the clandestine movement of undocumented
migrants and asylum seekers across international borders through the circumvention of
state regulatory norms for financial gain. As human smuggling continues without signs
of significant decrease, states have begun to cooperate through transnational policy
development. According to the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air, a supplement to the 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime, the smuggling of migrants can be defined as “the procurement, in order
to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of
a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.”2
The document distinguishes smuggling from human trafficking, or "the recruitment,
transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person by such means as threat or use of
force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or deception for the purpose of
exploitation."3 The UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) provides four
criteria to distinguish human smuggling from trafficking, summarized as follows:
smuggling is by definition consensual and involves a financial exchange in return for the
crossing of international borders. Trafficking, in contrast, is always coercive and can
occur domestically or internationally. Traffickers benefit not only from the process of
transportation, but also the exploitation of the victim for financial gain. As Kyle and
Koslowski point out, a lack of a clear distinction between the two concepts largely
prevented transnational and trans organizational cooperation until the year 2000 when the
UN General Assembly laid out these explicit definitions within the convention. Since
2

UN General Assembly, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 15 November 2000, p. 2.
3
UN General Assembly, Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime, 15 November 2000, p. 7.
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then, there has been a demonstrated effort to ensure policy better identifies and targets the
problem, opening the door for states to be able to respond appropriately.4 How policy
become practice, and the ways in which such policies affect both smugglers and migrants
will be explored in further chapters.
Despite the extensive literature and policy dedicated to establishing why
smuggling and trafficking are inherently different, these concepts can in fact transform or
occur simultaneously. Smuggling, which is strictly the movement of people to a specific
destination, can easily turn into trafficking if the actions of smugglers become
exploitative. The dangerous and clandestine nature of smuggling endangers migrants,
particularly asylum seekers, who are forced by circumstance to flee their home country
and do not have the ability to pass through official ports of entry with valid
documentation. Instead, they face the decision to stay home at risk of persecution or flee,
which likely requires placing their lives in the hands of a criminal ‘expert.’ A smuggler is
an ‘entrepreneur’ of sorts, and their primary goal is to profit off of their ‘product’ migrants.5 Therefore, the safety and wellbeing of migrants is rarely a priority. It is not
uncommon for irregular migrants to suffer beatings, sexual assault, severe hunger,
robbery, and a host of other abuses. They may be sent by the hundreds across the
Mediterranean Sea on boats not designed to hold so many people, forced en masse into
warehouses for indefinite amounts of time, or are unwittingly passed into the hands of
traffickers. The term ‘choice’ should be applied loosely when speaking of the decision to

4

David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2011), 7.
5
Emma Herman, "Migration as a Family Business: The Role of Personal Networks in the Mobility Phase
of Migration," International Migration 44, no. 4 (2006): 195, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2006.00384.x.
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employ smugglers, as often staying at home can place migrants in horrifically violent and
traumatic circumstances.
The separation of smuggling and trafficking policy was intended to better identify
the crime committed and protect those subject to trafficking. However, a differentiation
of terms that relies on the presence or absence of coercion and exploitation can become
problematic. The “unscientific nature of the term ‘exploitation’”6 and the assumption that
smuggling is a definitively consensual agreement allows room for smugglers to avoid
accountability for any coercion or violence that takes place during the journey. However,
the consensual nature of the initial agreement to be smuggled should not be interpreted as
responsibility for any violence that takes place afterward. The policy framework’s
subjectivity is problematic for asylum seekers, who are not protected by trafficking laws
even if they are exploited and suffer abuse during their journey. Jacqueline Bhabha
presents a possible solution to this problem: in lieu of using the terms “exploitation,”
“coercion” and “consent” to differentiate between smuggling and trafficking, “it may be
more satisfactory to use the presence (trafficking) or absence (smuggling) of an enduring
exploitative relationship after the travel is completed as the distinguishing criterion.”7 If
policy were restructured in this way, migrants who employ smugglers and are then forced
into exploitative labor extending past their period of travel would be protected under
trafficking law.

6

Jacqueline Bhabha, "Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human
Rights," Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2002nd ser., 15:22n8,
www.mcrg.ac.in/AddReading/2008/C_Bhaba.pdf.
7
Ibid.
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B. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND SMUGGLING

The fairly recent, yet urgent concern regarding smuggling and trafficking gives
rise to the question of what are the primary factors that contribute to the growth of human
smuggling as a worldwide phenomenon. Past literature on the subject consistently
emphasizes three factors that have led to industry growth, particularly within the past two
decades: globalization, global crises, and state responses to mass migration. Globalization
and global crises have caused a record increase in the number of global migrants, while
tightened border controls and barriers to migration through official channels encourage
migrants to seek alternative, clandestine routes.
Socioeconomic inequality forces poverty-stricken populations from their homes
and draws them to countries with more economic opportunity, one of the reasons for a
spike in regular and irregular migration. Furthermore, ever-expanding technological
resources permeate even the most rural and impoverished regions, making information
sharing and communication easier now more than ever. A mother in El Salvador can now
speak to her son in New York on a regular basis and a family in Somalia may research
various advertisements on Facebook for smuggling services from their hometown all the
way to Europe. Syrians still at home can connect with their loved ones who have safely
reached Europe, to learn of the best routes to pursue asylum. People can learn of foreign
experiences, opportunities, and protections that may not be available in their home
countries. Advancements in information sharing and transportation also facilitate faster
and more effective communication within smuggling networks by providing updated
information on the status of routes in relation to factors such as border security and
weather, which allows for rapid itinerary and logistical changes.

6

Interstate conflict and transnational organized crime in the Sahel, anti-Muslim
genocide in Myanmar, civil war in Syria and South Sudan, religious extremism in
Somalia and Kenya, the immediate impact of the climate change across the Asian and
African continents, brutal violence in the aftermath of war in Iraq, gang activity in
Central America, and poverty worldwide have simultaneously produced record levels of
mass migration. As new communication methods allow people to learn more about
opportunities abroad and threats to life and livelihood continue at home, people are both
incentivized and forced to cross borders and resettle in other countries. Migrant
populations were once monopolized by those seeking economic opportunity, but
terrorism, ethnic conflict, civil and international war, and state sanctioned violence, have
tipped the scales and led to record numbers of asylum seekers. Although each story and
experience is unique and should be treated as such, one gains a vague understanding of
what conflicts give rise to population displacement by examining the origin countries of
people smuggled into Europe. For example, the Central Mediterranean and the Apulia
and Calabria smuggling routes, are dominated by Syrians, Eritreans, Nigerians and
Somalis, who have been forced to flee due to civil war, militarized authoritarian
governments, violent extremist groups, and failed state systems that breed further
afflictions including violence, organized crime, economic instability and terrorism.8
Contemporaneously, destination states, including EU Member States, the United
States, and Australia, which are relatively economically and politically stable, are
strengthening border security measures and placing increasing restrictions on who may
enter and stay in the country. Despite the high demand to reach developed countries,
which are among the most desirable for the resources and protections they offer, the
8

Frontex, "Migratory Routes Map," FRONTEX.
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majority of the world’s 22.5 million refugees are internally displaced or live in camps in
countries that presently also suffer conflict, crisis or underdevelopment, including
Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, Uganda and Ethiopia. Among the ten countries that host
the most refugees, Germany, ranked at number nine, is the only European country. The
other nine either suffer conflict or are adjacent to conflict zones. In fact, Europe only
hosts 17% of the world’s 65.6 million forcibly displaced people, in contrast to Africa and
the Middle East which in combination host 56%.9 While policy initiatives by EU
destination states are designed to curb migration from Asia and Africa, many scholars
argue that these efforts may increase irregular migration to Europe and create an
inclination among migrants to utilize smuggling networks to do so.

C. IRREGULAR MIGRATION POLICY

Resistance to irregular migration to Europe has manifested itself in policy focused
on deterrence and militarized border security, which takes on a criminal perspective of
migrants. However, their responses have had the opposite effect of what was intended:
tightening border security will not, and has not stopped irregular migration, it will only
make it more dangerous, more expensive, and more elusive. To support this point, Kyle
and Koslowski bring up the case of the U.S. Mexico Border. During the 1980s, U.S.
border security was increased dramatically in response to high levels of irregular
migration. Instead of curbing migration, these policies, in turn, encouraged people to
employ smugglers to assist them in crossing the border. According to the Mexican
Migration Project and UNODC, in 2005, 96 percent of irregular migrants crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border employed professional smugglers, compared to 73 percent in 1975.
9

Malaka Gharib, "CHART: Where The World's Refugees Are," NPR, March 27, 2017.
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This 23 percent increase can be attributed in part to the frequently reproduced
“Prevention Through Deterrence” (PTD) strategy, and demonstrates the smuggling
industry’s demand-driven monopoly of clandestine border crossing operations in
response to a lack of alternative options.10
Between October 2000 and September 2014, the bodies of 2,721 migrants were
recovered in Southern Arizona alone.11 PTD was implemented in the 1990s in response to
an influx of irregular migrants crossing the border from Mexico, particularly in urban
areas such as El Paso. U.S. border security officials permeated the cities and more
densely populated areas, funneling migrants into the uninhabited rural deserts, which are
home to harsh landscapes and bandits. The hope was that the expensive and often fatal
journey through the desert would do the work of border patrol officers to deter
migrants.12 This was not the case: because PTD did not address the root push and pull
factors causing this population influx, it has only encouraged migrants to traverse more
dangerous routes that require the assistance of smugglers. Furthermore, the correlation
between the increase in irregular migrants entering the United States through the desert
and the increase in fatalities in this region is strong, demonstrating how militarized
reactions to migration produce violence.13 Ironically, as states seek to end irregular
migration, they unwittingly have caused a spike in migrant smuggling without curbing
irregular border crossings, which subsequently supports transnational organized crime by
providing another profit source to their operations. From this case one can observe that

10

David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2011), 7.
11
Jason De León, Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail (University of California
Press, 2015), 29.
12
Ibid., 31.
13
Ibid., 35.
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migration policy often creates a cyclical effect: as states increase border security and
barriers to legal channels for migration, irregular migration and human smuggling also
increase. This is in part due to the close relationship between the two phenomena. Instead
of recognizing the undesired consequences, states respond by continuing to increase
border security, only further promoting illicit and dangerous activities.
Border security policy has been approached through both domestic initiatives as
well as international cooperation. These actions are supported by an organizational
structure which Triandafyllidou and Maroukis describe as the “border bureaucracy.”
Included in this bureaucracy are barriers and checkpoints including “border crossing
points, border guards, passport controls, entry visas and passport stamps for those
entering or leaving a country” as well as “a range of ‘border actors’ including not only
state authorities but also non-governmental organizations, international organizations and
criminal networks for human smuggling and trafficking.”14 Technological advancements
in border security are a new development in the border bureaucracy system, which
Dijstelbloem and Meijer describe as the “e-Border.” Detailed “risk files” on individuals
are composed, satellites, air crafts and sea vessels monitor the Mediterranean Sea and the
thousands of migrants that cross it each week, and imported cargo is investigated using
heat sensors and carbon dioxide detectors.15
The increasingly restrictive and hostile nature of immigration policy is closely
related to the way in which migration is often associated with acts of violence and
terrorism in public discourse, however baseless these assumptions may be. Popular biases
are reproduced through policy initiatives that aim to exclude specific populations or
14

Anna Triandafyllidou and Thanos Maroukis, Migrant smuggling: Irregular Migration from Asia and
Africa to Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 5.
15
Ibid., 1.
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aspects of their culture, demonstrating that a high level of identity politics is at play. For
example, in August 2001, the MV Tampa, a Norwegian freight ship 140 kilometers off
the coast of Christmas Island, was denied entry into Australian territorial waters after the
Australian Government learned that the ship had rescued 433 Afghan asylum seekers off
of Indonesia who had employed the assistance of smugglers.16 Disobeying the Australian
Government’s commands, the captain entered Australian waters, declaring a state of
emergency and alerting officials of the critical condition of many of the passengers.
Australian troops boarded the ship, provided medical care, and attempted to coerce the
crew into turning around.17 That night, the Prime Minister introduced an emergency bill,
“Border Protection Bill 2001,” which failed to pass the Senate. The Bill would have
allowed the Australian government to forcibly remove any ship from territorial waters
deemed to have entered unlawfully.18 The passengers never were allowed onto Australian
soil and after five days aboard the Tampa, they were received by the governments of New
Zealand and Nauru.19
Although the Australian Government received international condemnation, their
handling of the Tampa case was widely supported among Australian citizens. In fact,
three days after the debacle, Melbourne’s Herald Sun administered a poll in which 96
percent of respondents approved of the government’s response. Furthermore, two days
after the Australian government got word of the Tampa’s approach, the following
statement was published in the Sydney Morning Herald, quoted from a letter send in by a
16

Peter D. Fox, "International Asylum and Boat People: The Tampa Affair and Australia 's ‘Pacific
Solution," Maryland Journal of International Law 25, no. 1 (2010): 356.
17
Niels Frenzen, "10th Anniversary of Australia’s Tampa Affair," Migrants at Sea, August 26, 2011.
18
Claudia Tazreiter, "Asylum-Seekers As Pariahs In The Australian State: Security Against The
Few," UNU-WIDER, 2003, 12.
19
Annabel Crabb, "Tampa Enters Australian Waters With 433 Asylum Seekers Onboard," ABC, June 17,
2012.
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John Thos Brown: “These boat people are not illegal immigrants, nor refugees, alleged or
otherwise. They are pirates, hijackers and thieves.”20 As Bhabha points out, the
conservative Australian government’s response to the arrival of asylum seekers, which
took place in the midst of an upcoming general election, and this flagrant display of
xenophobic popular opinion demonstrate the ways in which policy reflects prejudice
towards migrants and vice versa.21

D. STATE RESPONSES TO MIGRANT SMUGGLING

U.S. Government officials have been condemned for the circumstances under
which they respond to the human cost of migrant smuggling. As the following example
demonstrates, state actors are willing to take action against human smuggling only after
major tragedies that garner public outcry, and these responses seldom identify the root
causes of this industry’s development. On June 6, 1993, the Golden Venture landed on
the shore of Queens, New York carrying 286 illegally smuggled Chinese migrants. The
ship ran aground after an altercation between the captain and a smuggler, after which
many passengers, malnourished from the four month journey, jumped into frigid waters.
Ten migrants drowned in efforts to reach the shore. While ninety percent were attempting
to claim asylum, only about ten percent were granted refugee status while the rest were
either deported or detained until 1997. In response, the Clinton Administration vowed to
use the fullest extent of the law to prosecute the smugglers responsible and aggressively
fight human smuggling in the future.22 The case of the Golden Venture demonstrates the

20

Jacqueline Bhabha, "Internationalist Gatekeepers?: The Tension Between Asylum Advocacy and Human
Rights," Harvard Human Rights Journal 15 (2002): 19.
21
Ibid.
22
Anthony M. Destefano, "1993 Ship Grounding Affected Immigration Policy," Newsday, June 02, 2013.
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high level of human cost required to elicit public awareness and aggressive state action.
As governments continue to fight smuggling by prosecuting individual actors, the
question arises: will their initiatives prove effective, or will this industry continue to
thrive as death tolls rise? States are reluctant to admit their own hand in the growth of this
industry through restrictive and militarized policy that prevents safe, legal arrivals to
destination states and instead motivates migrants to put their lives in jeopardy in an effort
to save them. This case demonstrates the tendency to blame this sort of tragedy on the
criminal greed and inhumanity of smugglers, who are prosecuted on an individual basis.
Despite the current implausibility of an alternative, it is doubtful that migrants would
employ such insidious actors if they were presented a safe and legal method of seeking
asylum.
The Golden Venture tragedy is not an anomaly; news headlines reporting on
migrant deaths on the Mediterranean and the U.S.-Mexico border are all too common.
Few will forget the image captured of Aylan, a three year old Syrian boy who was found
dead on the shore of Bodrum, Turkey in September of 2015, only one of over 3,515
deaths recorded on the Mediterranean that year - a journey that almost exclusively
requires the employment of smugglers. 23 On the contrary, such cases makes one question
whether the stunning regularity of these tragedies is normalizing migrant deaths rather
than creating a sense of urgency and accountability on the part of state officials. While I
do not have the answer to this question, the ceaselessness of this issue and the increasing
death toll in the Central Mediterranean suggests the former.

23

Ishaan Tharoor, "A Dead Baby Becomes the Most Tragic Symbol Yet of the Mediterranean Refugee
Crisis," The Washington Post, September 02, 2015; International Organization for Migration,
"Mediterranean." Missing Migrants Project 2018.
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Security tactics are not limited to prosecuting irregular migrants and
“professional” smugglers, but extend to citizens who assist this vulnerable population. A
recent increase in violent police raids in France has encouraged homelessness among the
migrant population. Residents have come together to establish support groups that assist
in providing migrants with basic necessities such as food and shelter. These citizens are
arrested and prosecuted for their humanitarian efforts, which are categorized as délit de
solidarité (crimes of solidarity) - an expansion of the definition of human smuggling.24
Lawmakers argue that such acts of solidarity violate Article 21 of the Revised
Ordonnance of 2 November 1945, which states:

any individual who, while s/he is in France, facilitates or tries to facilitate
the entry, circulation or irregular residence of a foreigner in France, either
directly or indirectly, will receive a five-year prison sentence and a fine of
200,000 FF (ħ30.490,00).25
As Jennifer Allsopp points out, this sort of policy is nothing new: in France “the scope of
the law has always been large and penalties have accrued with time,”26 The partial
adoption of the Schengen Agreement of 19 June 1990 further demonstrates French
lawmakers’ desire to broaden the definition of smuggling in order to deter citizens from
supporting irregular migrants by placing their activities outside of the law. This was
achieved by refusing to adopt the clause that includes “for-profit” in the practice of

24

Kyle G. Brown, "France Prosecuting Citizens for 'Crimes of Solidarity'," France | Al Jazeera, January 25,
2017.
25
Jennifer Allsopp, "Contesting Fraternité: Vulnerable Migrants and the Politics of Protection in
Contemporary France," Refugee Studies Centre, 82nd ser. (July 2012): 13.
26
Ibid.
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helping to facilitate the journey of undocumented migrants within the Schengen
territory.27
As irregular migration continues without signs of slowing, particularly across the
Mediterranean into Europe, international intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations seek to find more humane alternatives to current migration policies
employed by states. The most recent example is the New York Declaration for Refugees
and Migrants, a declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly on September 19,
2016. All 193 Member States came to the consensus that refugees and asylum seekers
must be protected and host states should be supported equitably by the international
community. There is a demonstrated concern for human smuggling and trafficking within
the text. They recognize the severity of the issue and encourage international cooperation
to further combat it by better identifying and supporting victims as well as “disrupting
and eliminating the criminal networks involved,” primarily through increased security
measures and the implementation the 2010 United Nations Global Plan of Action to
Combat Trafficking in Persons.28 While these efforts are a step in the right direction, due
to their emphasis on security measures, they fail to properly identify the ways in which
immigration policy and border security fuel this industry they are trying so desperately to
eliminate. If there were a viable legal channel to asylum, the Golden Venture tragedy
likely would not have occurred and French citizens would not be taking responsibility for
providing basic care to refugees. State officials may well understand that irregular
migration drives smuggling and barriers to regular migration drive irregular migration,
but stopping smuggling necessitates the elimination of the driving factors of irregular
27

Ibid.
UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants: resolution / adopted by the
General Assembly, 3 October 2016, A/RES/71/1, p. 7.

28
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migration. This may be accomplished either by finding a (virtually non-existent) solution
to global conflict or by creating a legitimate, timely and accessible path to destination.

E. THE HUMAN COST OF STATE RESPONSES

The most reprehensible consequence of state responses to irregular migration (and
their inability to adequately address human smuggling) is the human cost. So far, in 2018
there have already been 710 recorded migrant deaths worldwide, including 410 in the
Mediterranean alone, making it the world’s deadliest migration zone. As previously
stated, border restrictions encourage migrants to traverse dangerous routes where they are
subject to financially-driven actors who likely are not concerned with protecting the
wellbeing of their clients. Migrants are forced by the hundreds onto boats not designed to
support even half of their passengers and are left to navigate the Mediterranean Sea
alone. All too often, news headlines report mass fatalities of migrants, as boats capsize
and passengers drown. What we do not see are the thousands more who are never
discovered or make the headlines; whose deaths go unnoticed, who are passed on to
traffickers, or are lost in the Sahara. Migrants also frequently face abuse along their
journey perpetrated by smugglers, state officials, and bandits alike, and include crimes
such theft, beatings, threats, coercion, and rape. Restrictions to migration have also been
shown to correlate with increases in exploitation. As journeys become more complex and
expensive, smaller actors are driven out of the industry, which in turn becomes
dominated by larger criminal organizations who also specialize in other exploitative
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activities, such as the trafficking of humans, drugs and arms, further putting migrants at
risk.29
In this way, transnational criminal organizations actually benefit from state
policies that aim to curb immigration. As routes are cut off, migrants become
increasingly desperate and seek out professionals to assist them in their journey. This
spike in demand for human smugglers is accompanied by increases in the cost of their
service. By making the journey more challenging and dangerous, states enable smugglers
to charge more, allowing them to thrive as demand shows no sign of diminishing. As this
illicit market expands, states take an increasingly militarized approach to irregular
migration and to migrants who, to be clear, are not inherently violent nor criminals.
Brysk and Choi-Fitzpatrick argue that this criminalized perspective of irregular migration
has encouraged states to prioritize the “securitization of smuggling” over the rights of
migrants, making asylum seekers more vulnerable since, being de facto stateless, they
find it extremely difficult to claim their rights.30
Despite improvements in the identification and prosecution of smugglers and
traffickers, a large dilemma remains with respect to asylum seekers. Kyle and Koslowski
point out that while it is important to break down these organized criminal networks and
prosecute those that promote the violence against and exploitation of migrants, it is
equally important to ensure that those fleeing persecution are able to reach safety. When
legal channels are not available, these same actors may be a saving grace. This is not to
say that human smuggling is an industry that should be promoted. On the contrary, it is a
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call to states to better understand the implications of their border security initiatives.
While states, particularly the United States and EU Member States, have a demonstrated
concern for border security, which they have taken great lengths to protect, it is unlikely
that policymakers will reflect on the state's role in “creating and sustaining human
smuggling or the nuances of its historical and sociological foundations.”31

F. RESEARCH DILEMMAS

Given the industry’s clandestine and evolving nature, as well as the inability of
many states - particularly states of origin - to collect extensive data, research is largely
dependent on qualitative rather than quantitative analysis, and data that accurately reflects
the extent of migrant smuggling has yet to be produced. Nevertheless, in a 2011 report,
the UNODC came to the following conclusions: 1) smuggling is directly connected to
corruption but the extent of the involvement of government officials is unknown; 2)
smugglers have a high level of adaptability as routes shift in response to countermigration efforts; 3) the nature of migrant-smuggler relationships is largely unknown; 4)
networks become increasingly complex as smaller actors are driven out in high security
areas.32 Nevertheless, the increasing severity of this issue, particularly across the Central
Mediterranean Route, has created a heightened interest in human smuggling that will
likely continue to produce more information on the subject.
There is scholarly disagreement regarding the perspective from which migrant
smuggling should be investigated. In contrast to previous studies, which take on either a
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social or economic perspective, Triandafyllidou and Maroukis combine the two
previously mutually exclusive categories into a study of a socioeconomic paradigm of
human smuggling. They acknowledge a variety of past studies, which demonstrate
smuggling’s high profitability, evidence that increases in border security also increase
levels of exploitation, as well as the fact that smuggling is disproportionately skewed
towards poor migrants, who are less discouraged by “better detection in the formal
employment sector.”33 While these studies are important, the authors argue that they lack
social analysis. There are many more details that are crucial to understanding human
smuggling industry, such as the nature of migrant-smuggler, how they come to be
introduced to one another, and who the smuggler is in relation to a much larger network
of actors. This form of analysis is not restricted to economic factors, but also stretches to
view the cultural and personal factors as equally significant to gaining a comprehensive
understanding of this form of transnational crime.34
This question relates to Triandafyllidou and Maroukis’ central theoretical and
empirical dilemma: based on their socioeconomic method of analysis, should human
smuggling be regarded as an exclusively criminal business, or as a social issue that
should be studied from a socio-relational perspective? They argue that the decision to
seek out smugglers should not simply be examined through cost benefit analysis. Yes,
economic factors are the primary cause of migration, but it is these factors that give rise
to the social dynamics that push people to make the difficult decision to migrate, seek
asylum and employ smugglers to complete their journey. Social relations are also crucial
in terms of the planning and successful completion of their journey. These relations
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should be investigated among migrants and their families, between migrants and
smugglers, as well as the various actors that make up the complex network of the
smuggling industry.
Taking my cue from Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, I focus in detail on the
Eastern Mediterranean route, an irregular migratory route from the Asia and Africa
through Turkey into the European Union. This route is dominated by human smugglers
and has long historical roots, but has experienced unprecedented popularity in recent
years as regular migratory channels have been cut off. In order to better understand the
relationship between state action, irregular migration, and smuggling, I examine relevant
global and EU policy and rights frameworks as well as Turkey’s migration and asylum
system.
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II. RELEVANT POLICY INSTRUMENTS
The following section is dedicated to examining policy instruments relevant to the
experiences of migrants and the responsibilities of states within the context of the
European Union as a global superpower. Particular focus is paid to the rights of migrants
and refugees protected by international law and within a global human rights framework.
European border security and immigration policy is also examined with a focus on the
legal-political structure of the European Union and its relationship with the national
policy of the sovereign states that comprise it. The purpose of this exploration is to
identify tensions in policy formation between two legitimate concerns, those for security
and those for human rights. Europe has experienced multiple terrorist attacks and
simultaneously high levels of migration from North Africa and the Middle East, which
contribute to increasingly xenophobic sentiments and a possible priority shift among
decision makers from protecting human rights to an improved ability to identify, monitor,
and control populations. The global and regional policy that follow in the analysis reflect
this perspective, as well as the need for long term, effective responses to a protracted
crisis that could very well become a permanent reality.

A. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK

The rights of migrants and refugees are protected by a global human rights
framework, grounded in United Nations (UN) conventions and made binding through
domestic and international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
entered into force in 1948 and is the cornerstone of international human rights law,
setting a standard among its signatory states to protect the dignity, rights, liberty and
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safety of its people. Although the UN is not a lawmaking body, and the document is a
resolution and therefore is nonbinding, its power lies in its affirmations that support the
content of another document: the UN Charter. The 1945 Charter of the United Nations is
binding to all states that signed and ratified it, yet the fundamental concept of state
sovereignty often obscures recognition, protection and enforcement of human rights.
At the time of the formation of the UDHR, the idea of universal human rights,
entitled to every person - not by virtue of being the citizen of a sovereign state, but by
virtue of being human - was an entirely new concept. Its ideals presented a tension
between the non binding nature of the document and the aim of protecting its content.
States could become party to the document without fear of violating its contents as the
United Nations lacks the power to interfere with state sovereignty. Furthermore, although
rights are entitlements, they must be claimed by an individual and ultimately guaranteed
by a state. The issue is, rights are all too frequently denied. This dynamic is easily
complicated as states are simultaneously the principle guarantors and violators of human
rights, presenting a very real obstacle to the protection of an individual’s life, liberty, and
dignity.35
Although the UDHR has been criticized as a baseless fantasy, particularly in its
initial years, its content became binding with the ratification of the International Bill of
Human Rights in 1976. This bill consists of the UDHR as well as two UN treaties: the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The covenants were
designed to outline the specific guidelines and limitations of the aspirations set forth in
the UDHR. Although human rights enforcement is still weak, it has improved drastically
35
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since the documents’ ratification. Formal institutions such as the European Court of
Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the European Union protect these “pillars of the international human rights framework”
on a regional basis. National policies often reflect and reinforce the UDHR, while
informal mechanisms, such as civil society efforts, occasionally have a comparable
capacity to influence state behavior. Transnational advocacy groups and nongovernmental organizations wield a significant ability to pressure state actors, and the
protection of human rights lies at the forefront of foreign policy priorities for certain
global powers, which now can apply pressure to those actors who violate human rights
through military intervention and financial sanctions. Now, as Gundogdu argues, the
protection of human rights, based on the contents of the UDHR and subsequent treaties,
is a necessary requirement for legitimate statehood.36
The UDHR begins by stating that all people “are born free and equal in dignity
and rights” and that these rights are universal entitlements, without discrimination on the
basis of identity or the political status of the individual or the state to which they belong.
In the aftermath of the two World Wars, the issue of statelessness and large scale
population displacement was more relevant than ever before, and the universal
application of human rights to all people, regardless of nationality or citizenship status
had the potential to protect millions of people from discrimination, violence,
statelessness, and insecurity. The document takes on a transnational nature as it
guarantees the right to leave any country, including one’s own. However, the right to exit
one country does not imply a right to enter another. In this sense, there is a tension
36
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between state sovereignty and human rights. In cases of political persecution, one has the
right to seek asylum in a foreign country. This is the foundation of international refugee
law but has nevertheless resulted in subsequent exclusion and derogation as states have
an obligation to hear claims but not grant asylum.
The First and Second World Wars produced millions of refugees, presenting a
crisis states were not prepared for. In 1921 progress ensued as the League of Nations
began to develop a series of protocols to protect the displaced and the stateless. In July of
1951 the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (popularly referred to as
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention) was adopted, followed by an amended 1967 Protocol
which expanded the scope of the Convention from a post-WWII Europe context to a
globally relevant document. The Convention, regarded as the “centrepiece of
international refugee protection today,”37 defines the term refugee and outlines the rights
and responsibilities of refugees and the legal obligations of the 148 signatory states to
protect these rights.38
The Convention attempts to prevent states from treating refugees as unwelcome
criminals. It recognizing the complicated and often dangerous nature of seeking asylum,
prohibiting penalties or punishment for entering a country “illegally” when coming from
a territory in which one’s life is in danger, given that the asylum seeker reports
themselves and makes an asylum claim immediately upon arrival. It also prevents states
from sending to another territory “a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds of
37
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national security or public order.”39 Article 33 prohibits the expulsion or return of a
refugee to a territory in which they are in danger of persecution on the basis of their
identity. This clause, better known as non-refoulement, is considered the core principle of
the Convention and is now protected under customary international law. It reinforces the
right to life by recognizing the very real dangers refoulement presents and the importance
of states to recognize claims of asylum as valid. The principle of non-refoulement also
prohibits states from preventing refugees from entering their territorial jurisdiction,
although instances like this take place all too often.40
Displaced people seek asylum when their home country is unable or unwilling to
protect their human rights. Without the protocols of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention,
the relationship between asylum seekers and destination states becomes foggy. The
Convention is a rights-based instrument that outlines more specifically the role of the
international community in protecting this vulnerable population. It emphasizes
multilateral cooperation and recognizes the international scope of mass migration, which
cannot be left to the responsibility of any single state. However, in spite of the
Convention, states are increasingly hostile toward refugee and migrant populations on the
grounds of security and economic concerns. Within the perceptual framework of “guilty
until proven innocent” and “illegality,” refugees are forced to prove the validity of their
claim through demonstrable physical trauma. As a result, “the suffering human body has
become a crucial site for claiming rights” as “states, courts, and refugee advocates have
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increasingly turned to the suffering bodies of asylum seekers and other migrants”41 to
find evidence of persecution.
The UDHR guarantees the “right to life, liberty and security of person.”42 Article
2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, a legally binding document offers
further protection of this right.43 As the death toll on the Mediterranean increases each
day, the right to life becomes a primary concern and there is more need than ever to
protect it. However, many argue that it is among the most violated rights in the context of
irregular migration to Europe. Indirect acts of violence including failure to rescue
distressed vessels, stopping migrants from reaching their jurisdiction in order to prevent
asylum claims in their territory, and sending migrants to potentially dangerous
environments, also known as “push-back,” can be seen as violations of this right, as well
as violation of the non-refoulement clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention, which
prohibits returning migrants to regions where they are at risk of persecution. Despite the
binding nature of the right to life as stated in the ICCPR, thorough investigations rarely
take place, and instead are “tolerated as an assumed risk of irregular travel”44
In an effort to improve state responses to mass migration, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in
September 2016. The Declaration is comprised of a series of commitments to refugees
and migrants in preparation for the creation of two related compacts to be presented by
the High Commissioner for Refugees in 2018: the Global Compact on Refugees and the
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Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. The first part of the Compact
on Refugees will contain a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) which
emphasizes “the need to respond in a comprehensive and predictable manner.”45 The
second part will outline a Programme of Action to support the framework with specific
policy and protocol suggestions for states. The contributors to the new framework
recognize that the refugee crisis is transforming into a sustained reality. States, however
are less willing to grant asylum to displaced people, whose movement is regarded as
“illegal” and who are treated as criminal suspects until their claim is accepted.
It is clear that the primary goal of this compact is to save lives through
cooperation, crisis prevention, and a rights-based perspective. Transit states and states
that border countries of origin are disproportionately affected by mass migration as their
financial capacities are stretched and cohesion is shocked by large population influxes.
This reality is acknowledged within the CRRF and its authors encourage other, non
transit or border countries to share responsibility as global leaders and protectors of the
rights and wellbeing of migrants. Instead of an ineffective and often damaging “quick
fix,” the CRRF’s strategy is promoted as a long-term investment in the wellbeing of
migrants, the socioeconomic progress of destination and transit states, and the sustainable
resilience of countries of origin.46
The framework is intended to implemented through the coordination of a wide
network of state and nonstate actors and will take a nuanced approach that should better
prepare states to respond to a broad range of situations. It envisions a policy framework
in which border security will effectively combat transnational crime without threatening
45

UN General Assembly, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants : resolution / adopted by the
General Assembly, 3 October 2016, A/RES/71/1, p. 16.
46
Ibid., 2-3.

27

the rights of migrants.47 The CRRF covers protocol for each step of migration including
search and rescue (SAR),48 reception and admission, support for immediate and longterm needs, support for destination countries and their communities, and sustainable
solutions.49 It is the first globally-conscious plan that looks at mass migration not as a
temporary crisis but rather as a protracted and perhaps permanent reality in the modern
world.

B. EUROPEAN UNION MIGRATION POLICY

The role of the European Union is complicated by its powerful yet non traditional
political framework - it lies somewhere in between the organizational structures of a
regime and a federation allowing for discrepancies between national and EU policy and
tensions between the priorities of regional and national political bodies.50 It is important
to be aware of this multidimensional legal framework and its implications when
examining regional migration policy.
The concept of free movement on the European continent has a long history, but
was legally formalized in the 1950s with the development of the Treaty of Rome and
subsequent Schengen Agreement. While the Treaty of Rome established Europe as a
singular economic community, the Schengen agreement effectively eliminated internal
border controls among its signatory states and expanded external border control,
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extending the provisions of the Treaty of Rome from workers to all people, allowing the
free movement of European citizens while preventing the arrival of “unwanted” migrants
particularly via the southern coastal and eastern land borders.51 The initial Agreement
was signed in 1985 by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands and
was formally implemented in June of 1990. Since the end of the Cold War, EU
immigration policy has intensified and from this point on the geopolitical scope of the
Schengen area expanded as more countries joined and a uniform visa and population
database were created.
The initial agreement was incorporated into the European Union legal framework
with the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in May 1999. This was the first step in the
development of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) as the new treaty extended
to cover further issues regarding asylum and migration and its relationship with the
Schengen area’s geographical and political framework.52 The CEAS came to be
comprised of a series of directives which established a system of Temporary Protection,
conditions of and qualifications for reception, and procedures regarding the treatment of
refugees and their claims.53
The Dublin Regulation (1997) was an important milestone in the development of
the CEAS. As the core of the “Dublin System”54 it affirms that one must claim asylum in
the state where they are first fingerprinted. This is the state responsible for processing
their claim and granting asylum. In 2015, the regulation was revised and Member States
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were permitted to deport migrants to the first country of entry into the EU. The Dublin
Regulation and its amendment were created to ensure timely processing of claims and to
hold states accountable for examining these claims, so as to not leave asylum seekers “in
orbit.”55 Furthermore, it discourages filing multiple claims within the Schengen Area in
order to prevent secondary movement and promote cost effectiveness. It was also
intended to maintain solidarity and “burden sharing” among Member States - the
foundational principle of the CEAS.56 Referring to an influx of displaced people as a
“burden” reveals how states are less concerned with protecting rights and safety and
ultimately see refugees as an inconvenience. In practice, the Dublin Regulation created an
undue burden on border states by preventing migrants from continuing their journey
northward, leading to overpopulation, strained resources, and congested borders as many
northern and eastern states evade responsibility.
The Treaty of Lisbon (2009) is the most recent development within the CEAS,
and consolidates the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the Maastricht Treaty (1993) into a
singular law.57 The Treaty of Rome initiated the concept of a single border region and
created a single market within the European Union, allowing for an unrestricted internal
flow of workers, goods and capital. The Maastricht Treaty further integrated the EU
through increased measures promoting economic and political cooperation. In particular,
the treaty deals with the external migration flows of third country nationals to the EU in
response to large-scale migration from Kosovo and former Yugoslavia in post Cold War
Europe. With the Lisbon Treaty, migration and asylum protocol were fully incorporated
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into EU law and enforced by the Court of Justice and Court of Human Rights. States are
obligated to share the responsibility of responding to asylum claims and managing
external borders, and provides for the creation of regional institutional mechanisms for
border and population management.58 It also encourages collaboration with third
countries in order to combat trafficking and smuggling, and improved uniformity, justice,
and expediency when processing asylum claims.59 The power and jurisdiction of EU
institutions such as the European Court of Justice are increased, strengthening the EU as
a supranational structure. Finally, it makes the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union legally binding. This Charter includes all provisions laid out in the
European Convention on Human Rights as well as international human rights law, such
as those spelled out in the UDHR and 1951 Refugee Convention.60
The institutional capacity of external border management has increased in recent
years, particularly on the southern coastal and eastern land borders, in response to a
consistent rise in the numbers of displaced people and related human smuggling activity
on irregular migration routes. As asylum and migration have been fully consolidated in
EU law, the European Union and its agencies have taken on a high level of power over
Europe’s borders and the framework for immigration control and border security has
become supranational in nature. The European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European
Union, better known as Frontex, was established in 2004 and is responsible for
“controlling and protecting” the borders of the Schengen Area. The agency was limited in
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scope until the height of the refugee crisis prompted a new mandate in 2016, after which
Frontex became part of a new institution, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
(EBCG). Under EBCG, Frontex is an autonomous body with substantially more
resources and operational capacities, an independent staff, and authority to carry out
missions without needing to recruit personnel from Member States.61 Furthermore, the
mandate expanded Frontex’s jurisdiction, which now has joint operations with the border
control agencies of neighboring third countries such as Turkey. These relationships
consist of technical and operational collaboration, information and personnel exchange,
and training. Frontex and Turkey signed a memorandum in which both parties agree to
engage in data and information sharing, officer training, programs to stop irregular
migration and seal borders, and joint forced returns.62 Frontex also works in conjunction
with the European Fisheries Control Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency.
Their operations are designed to comply with the UN’s maritime search and rescue
framework, comprised of three treaties: The International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, and
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

C. THE HUMAN COST OF THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Smuggling is addressed in accordance with the 2000 UN Protocol Against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplement to the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. It is further addressed in the Tampere, Hague, and
Stockholm Action Plans (1999-2004). Although the Plans lay out objectives and protocol

61
62

Frontex, "Frontex’s Role in the EU Turkey Statement,” FRONTEX.
Frontex, "Third Countries,” FRONTEX.

32

for the successful implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam and are non binding in and
of themselves, they are significant for a variety of reasons. They provide the framework
for future policy creation and implementation, demonstrate the relevance of smuggling in
the context of migration and security, and establish the governing bodies of the EU as key
arbiters with significant power to set the agenda.63
In contrast to the UN rights-based framework, Frontex operations are grounded in
an anti-crime, security-based perspective that reflects EU resistance to migrant
population influxes. Operation Triton, for example, was a naval security mission
implemented by Frontex in November 2014 to combat human smuggling and deter
irregular migration on the Central Mediterranean Route from Libya to Italy. The
operation replaced the more effective Mare Nostrum initiative, Italy’s humanitarian
search and rescue (SAR) program. Mare Nostrum saved the lives of over 100,000
migrants in one year, a success that prompted criticism that successful SAR operations
such as this were actually a pull-factor, increasing irregular migration. Unlike Mare
Nostrum, Triton had an explicit focus on border security rather than SAR or human
rights, despite prior recognition that abruptly dismantling Mare Nostrum and adopting the
new approach of non-assistance and decreased operational radius puts migrant lives at
risk. Fontex’s Interim Executive Director even stated that “while Mare Nostrum is clearly
a search and rescue operation, Triton will be with a main focus on border control.” The
operation continued, despite opposition from not only international bodies such as the
UNHCR and Amnesty International, but also from members of EU agencies and

63

Christina Boswell and Andrew Geddes. Migration and Mobility in the European Union. Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 52-3.

33

institutions. Decision makers hoped hearing of no more possibility of rescue and the
rising death toll would deter prospective migrants from making the journey.64
Purposefully increasing human cost as a means of deterrence on a particular
irregular border crossing route is a method employed all too often and exemplifies a
blatant apathy towards migrant fatalities. The operation did not reach as closely to Libyan
shores as Mare Nostrum, personnel was limited, and state-operated rescue was
suspended. As a result, overcrowded ships of asylum seekers were forced to sail farther
out to sea. Journeys became longer, increasing the likelihood for capsize and drowning.
According to UN Maritime Law, captains are required to attempt rescue should they
become aware of a vessel in distress. As states no longer participated in SAR, other
vessels at sea, such as merchant and private ships, were called upon to fill in this gap and
untrained civilians were forced to take on the burden of responsibility.65
Contrary to the predictions of Frontex officials, migrants continued to cross the
Mediterranean at the same rate after Mare Nostrum was discontinued. However, because
SAR operations were no longer in place, the death toll quickly began to rise. Mare
Nostrum ended on December 31, 2014. Between January 22 and February 8, the death
toll peaked at an estimated 365 lives lost. In the months that followed, conditions were
not remedied and death tolls remained steady as ships went undetected, deployment took
hours, and Triton vessels were ill-equipped to care for those suffering from hypothermia.
The “Black Week” of April 2015 is the most frequently cited example of the deadly
consequences of deterrence-based maritime operations such as Operation Triton, despite
countless warnings. Between the 12th and 18th of April, predictions became a
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nightmarish reality as over 1,200 migrants were killed in circumstances that could have
been avoided. Numbers were skyrocketing, as they typically do in April as the weather
warms and the seas begin to calm. On the 12th alone, 3,791 people were rescued.
Operational personnel, however, were not sufficient to meet such numbers, and this
deliberate vacuum in SAR capacity directly caused the incredible loss of human life that
would come in the following days. 66
A boat carrying some six or seven hundred passengers suffered engine problems
soon after leaving the Libyan shore. The captain put in multiple distress calls. Rather than
deploying rescue vessels, the Italian Coast Guard encouraged the ship to continue
forward until they reached Italian waters. The migrant vessel soon reached a large oil
platform among many other ships, but approached with caution, not knowing if these
ships were Libyan. The passengers began to argue over the nationality of the ships and
moved en masse to the port side to get a better look. This movement tipped the already
unstable and over-capacity boat, causing it to capsize. Though they tried, the few present
vessels were ill equipped to rescue the hundreds of people now cast to sea and without
life jackets. It is estimated that over four hundred people drowned. Six days later, after
being contacted by the Italian Coast Guard, a large cargo vessel approached a wooden
fishing boat carrying eight hundred and attempted rescue. One of the boats accelerated
towards the other, causing a collision (although testimonies conflict as to which of the
two boats accelerated). The smaller migrant boat capsized on impact and only twenty
eight people were rescued, compared to the almost eight hundred individuals who
drowned, including hundreds of women and children.67
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Leaving Search and Rescue to the responsibility of civilian vessels leads to deadly
consequences for a number of reasons. The ships are not designed for rescue missions,
often being so disproportionately large that they can cause migrant vessels to capsize or
are unable to transfer passengers from one vessel to another. Further, they are neither
trained, nor equipped for SAR operations. The limited presence of Frontex and national
coast guard vessels further reduces the chances of successful rescue - or any attempt at
rescue at all. Instead of mending the limitations of Operation Triton, however, the
program was expanded in 2015 and a new military operation, EUNAVFOR MED
Operation Sophia, was launched. This operation is carried out by the militaries of
Member States and aims to reduce human smuggling in the region through surveillance,
identification, and dismantling of smuggling networks and their assets. It has been
criticized for improperly addressing smuggling as it does not combat its on-shore origins,
but rather only a small portion of a complex operation.68
Complicated Search and Rescue protocol also has high human costs. State and
nonstate actors alike frequently deny responsibility for carrying out rescue missions,
despite their obligations as spelled out in UN Conventions regarding Maritime Rescue.
This all to often leaves distressed migrants in life threatening circumstances. In 2007,
twenty seven people were forced to cling to a fishing net for five days in open waters as
the Libyan and Maltese governments argued over whose responsibility it was to rescue
them.69 This example demonstrates the need for continued policy creation that provides
for immediate and effective rescue protocol and clearly defines the party responsible for
the mission. It also highlights the perspective of states, who typically see irregular
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migrants, including those with a legal right to asylum, as a burden and even a threat to
their economic, social and political stability.70

D. CONCLUSION

This chapter has highlighted the tensions that European countries face as they
experience consistently high levels of migration since World War II, most significantly
that between protecting the rights of migrants and maintaining sovereignty and security
by controlling external borders. This conflict is fundamental to the nature of human
rights, as states are their sole guarantor and primary violator. The right to life has become
a primary concern, as states are legally obligated to protect this right, yet the annual death
toll on the Mediterranean remains in the thousands. We have also seen the internal
contradictions of UN Conventions, which exist as fundamental global norms, yet are
nonbinding and often unenforceable. Despite binding legislation, the loopholes that allow
states to evade granting asylum, such as denying responsibility for SAR, demonstrate the
position of uncertainty that migrants continue to occupy. The successes and pitfalls of
SAR and maritime anti-smuggling operations bring light to the struggle the EU faces as it
tries to balance protecting its borders and protecting the lives of those who cross them.
They also highlight the complicated nature of the European Union as a uniquely powerful
political structure, and the simultaneous operation of local, national and supranational
powers. In the following chapter I explore how these tensions have played out in the case
of mass migration to Turkey and onward into Europe and how state responses to irregular
transit migration affect the experiences of migrants, almost always in harmful ways.
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III. TRANSIT MIGRATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN:
WHY MIGRANTS DO NOT WANT TO STAY IN TURKEY

A. INTRODUCTION

Among the many migration routes through the Mediterranean to Europe, the
Eastern Corridor from the Northern Africa and the Middle East to Turkey and then
Greece has long been known for its high levels of irregular migrant traffic and smuggling
activity. Migration flows peaked in 2015 with 885,386 border crossings to Greece - a
number seventeen times higher than the previous year.71 Now, Turkey hosts more
internationally displaced people than any other country in the world.72 Entry and exit
points shift between land and sea borders based on the number of migrants, their
countries of origin, and whether there are conditions preventing passage through certain
routes, such as weather and border securitization measures. Since January 2015, land
borders are lesser traveled and more than one million migrants have landed on Greek
shores. In the first three weeks of 2018, there were 847 arrivals to Greece, all by sea.73
The Greek Isles receive the bulk of irregular migrants and the islands of Kos and Lesvos
are particularly popular for their proximity to the Turkish provinces of Aydın, İzmir,
Balıkesir and Çanakkale (located approximately 2.5 and 9 miles across the Aegean Sea,
respectively).74 The most frequently traversed land routes into the EU are from the
Turkish provinces of Kırklareli and Edirne into northeastern Greece and southeastern
71
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Bulgaria, respectively. The path from Turkey, Greece, then northward through the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia is commonly known as
the Balkan Route.75
The Eastern Mediterranean Corridor’s historical significance, geographic
location, continuously high levels of transit migration, and the diversity of policy
responses create a unique context for analysis. Such factors allow for a more
comprehensive exploration of why displaced people come to Turkey, and why they don’t
stay. People flee their homes not by choice, but by necessity; because they fear they will
not survive if they stay. The factors that cause mass flight may encourage an outsider to
assume Turkey a destination country, offering stability, economic opportunity, and
democratic values - all potential pull factors. This, however, is not the case. Displaced
people continue to leave Turkey, or at least try to, via irregular methods. In this chapter I
determine why Turkey remains a transit state, despite recent policy initiatives that
prevent irregular migration to Europe that force displaced, non-Turkish nationals to stay
in Turkey. To answer this question I first draw attention to the pull factors that encourage
irregular migration to Turkey, namely the country’s location and hope for protection
within its borders. I then review Turkey’s asylum and migration framework, most notably
its maintenance of the geographical limitation on the 1951 Refugee Convention, the
passing of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) in 2013, and the
2016 EU-Turkey Statement. Finally, I explore the effects such policies have on the
experiences of migrants within Turkey and at its borders, with a particular focus on the
rights violations that occur within the country’s asylum framework.
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I conclude that Turkey is a state of transit because it is a dangerous place for
migrants, which stirs fear, frustration, and desperation - push factors that encourage
secondary migration to Europe. Recent policy measures such as the EU-Turkey deal,
though touted as humane solutions to irregular migration, only offer small improvements
and many problems remain.76 Under the EU’s guise of opening its borders to refugees
and providing a regular path to asylum, Turkey enjoys freedom from scrutiny as migrants
are forced to live in harsh conditions with little guarantees to protection and basic
necessities.77 Ultimately, asylum seekers have become hostage to precarious
circumstances that open the door to numerous rights abuses, while virtually eliminating
the possibility of situational improvement or the ability to leave Turkey altogether. By
exploring irregular transit migration in Turkey, I also aim to contribute to a broader
understanding of national and intergovernmental approaches to migration, the effects of
Syrian population displacement on policy development, and the influence of state
interests on the experiences of migrants. While irregular migration is constant, it also is
constantly changing. It is therefore necessary to continuously revisit the way states
respond to population influxes in order to assure states are upholding the rights and needs
of migrants and are held accountable in the all too frequent case they do not. The human
costs of irregular migration to and through Turkey demand a critical look at the legal
frameworks purportedly designed to protect migrants, yet actually put their lives in
danger.
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B. PULL FACTORS TO TURKEY

For almost a century Turkey has been a hub for asylum seekers and various forms
of irregular migration. From the 1920s through the 90s over a million people migrated to
Turkey. The Cold War, conflicts in Iraq and Iran during the 80s, and the fall of the Soviet
Union created population influxes from the Middle East and post-Soviet states. Harsh
discrimination by state and nonstate actors push the large Kurdish diaspora to flee Turkey
in large numbers. The Arab Spring in 2011 furthered displacement and the Syrian Civil
war brought numbers to an all time high in 2015. Today, in addition to Syrians, the
Mediterranean Route is traversed by people arriving from Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Somalia, Iraq and Iran - the countries at the forefront of migration to the EU.78
Turkey, lying at the crossroads between the south, west, and east experiences
drastically higher migratory flows than EU Member States, which see Turkey as a buffer
between the Schengen territory and the global south and east. Situated directly between
some of the world’s most troubled countries and Europe makes Turkey a “de facto
country of first asylum,” the stepping stone between peril and prosperity. 79 While many
plan to forge on to Europe immediately after entering Turkey, others remain in Turkey, at
least temporarily. Hope for a steady income, relative stability, access to resources, and
co-ethnic community are some of the pull factors drawing displaced people to Turkey.
The belief that Turkey offers sufficient protection and hope that the causes of
displacement are temporary can initially discourage migrants from attempting longer
journeys.
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Turkey historically had lax border security enforcement, as officials were happy
to let unwanted migrant populations continue on to Europe.80 Today, although border
securitization has drastically increased, the country’s tourist visa policies may be an
appealing solution to migrants who are able to obtain one and enter the country through
official checkpoints. Visa policies depend on the country of origin. Citizens from certain
countries benefit from a visa-free policy and only require a passport to stay in the country
for up to ninety days. Others are required to obtain an e-Visa online or a standard visa at
a Turkish diplomatic office in their country of origin. Migrants become irregular if they
overstay or fail to renew their visa, do not claim asylum or apply for domestic protection,
or work without a permit. However, many asylum seekers often find it impossible to
acquire a visa for a host of reasons. They may lack the required papers, do not have
access to the internet or the embassy or consulate, or do not have a credit card, which is
necessary to be able to acquire an e-Visa. These barriers can make it necessary to cross
borders irregularly. To enter the country, Syrian, Afghan, Bangladeshi, Somali and Iraqi
citizens are required to have a visa, while Iranians must have a visa for stays over ninety
days.81 While asylum seekers should be absolved of the crime of irregular border crossing
post facto, this does not stop border officials from taking violent measures to prevent
migrants from entering and subsequently claiming asylum in Turkey.

C. THE TURKISH ASYLUM FRAMEWORK

The long history of irregular migration in Turkey has contributed to a number of
policy developments in recent decades. Until 2013, asylum and migration were regulated
80
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by three laws: Law No. 5682 on Passports (15 July 1950), Law No. 5683 on Residence
and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (24 July 1950), and the 1994 Regulation on
Asylum.82 The Law on Passports addressed cross-border movement, which required
proper documentation and a visa. It also determined who was (and was not) permitted to
enter the country. The list of those forbidden entry include,

Tramps and beggars, insane persons, or those suffering from contagious
diseases… persons ‘perceived’ to have come to Turkey for the purpose of
destroying security and public order or assisting persons who intended do
so, prostitutes and persons who incited women to prostitution, or were
involved in ‘white women trading,’ and all types of smuggler, persons
who could not prove they had enough money to live in or depart from
Turkey or could not prove that they would not engage in employment
prohibited to foreigners.83
The language employed demonstrates the antiquity of the laws, which nevertheless
remained in effect until 2013. One can also see the high degree of discretion afforded
officials when determining whether to grant border entry.
The Law on Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey gave specificity to the
otherwise vague Law on Passports. It granted residence permits to non-citizens staying in
Turkey for more than ninety days and, with supplementary legislation, differentiated
between various types of permits. Applications for residence and grounds for detention
and deportation were reviewed by local police officials, who could deny residence for
political, economic, religious, or security reasons.84 Evidently, the high level of discretion
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granted to officials in the Passport Law was also present in the legislation, which opened
the door to discrimination and exclusion. Over subsequent decades, this legal framework
quickly became outdated as migratory patterns evolved and global migration increased.
Because migration was regulated by multiple laws and secondary legislation, its
governing framework also lacked specificity and clarity. The National Action Plan (NAP)
for the adoption of the EU asylum acquis85 came into force in 2005 in an effort to remedy
these limitations and create an asylum framework more in-line with European asylum
standards.86
Until recent years, Turkey long sought accession to the EU, but was continuously
denied in part because lawmakers refused to lift the geographical limitations of the 1951
Refugee Convention when the 1967 Protocol was written. In doing so, Turkey is one of
only two signatories that only grants refugee status to European asylum seekers. Despite
protests from the EU, Turkey’s 1994 Asylum Regulation made the incomplete adoption
of the convention official. This regulation was “the first piece of domestic legislation
Turkey adopted in order to regulate the processing and treatment of persons seeking
asylum in Turkey.” Prior, UNHCR took charge of ‘refugee status determination’ (RSD)
procedures for all non-European claims under its own international mandate, but the new
regulation granted the Turkish National Police discretion over the process by splitting
applications into two categories with separate protocol. Rather than a migration agency,
the Foreigners Dept. of the National Police handled claims because residence permits
were viewed as a temporary step prior to resettlement rather than a long-term or
permanent situation. Europeans were processed by Turkish authorities while asylum
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claims from non-Europeans were now either reviewed by UNHCR or submitted to the
ministry of Interior for the protection of the Turkish government. 87
The rights stipulated in the 1951 Refugee Convention are only granted to those
granted refugee status by the state that accepted their claim to asylum. Because of the
geographical limitation, asylum seekers in Turkey are not afforded the same rights as
refugees. Under Turkish law, they can even be deported after UNHCR has accepted their
claim if third country resettlement takes too long.88 Turkey was scheduled to lift the
geographical limitation in 2012, which would have allowed migrants to claim asylum
from the Turkish government and relieved the UNHCR of its “direct operational role in
Turkey” but this did not happen.89 While Turkey is unconstrained by the 1951 Refugee
Convention, deportation or preventing entry could violate the UN Convention Against
Torture and the case laws of the European Court of Human Rights, which also contain a
non-refoulement clause and prohibit returning migrants to countries where they could be
subject to torture or other harmful or degrading treatment.90 The geographical limitation
has allowed Turkey to evade its responsibility to hear asylum claims. Because the
convention is virtually powerless within the country’s borders, the lack of rights actually
encourages transit migration activity to the EU, which may be more appealing to asylum
seekers who fear refoulement or getting “stuck” in a country that does not afford the same
protections as European states.91
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I. THE LAW ON FOREIGNERS AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION

In April 2014, Turkey adopted Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International
Protection (LFIP). This framework consolidated previously complicated legislation and
was intended to address irregular migration and bolster administrative and border security
capacities.92 It also created a system of domestic protection for internationally displaced
people, with special provisions for Syrians under the Temporary Protection Regulation of
2014, a supplement to Article 91 of the LFIP. The Directorate General for Migration
Management (DGMM), a newly created civilian agency under the Ministry of the
Interior, is in charge of implementing the contents of the LFIP and subsequent
regulations.93 UNHCR continues to hear asylum claims from non-Syrians, while the
DGMM is responsible for processing Temporary Protection applications from Syrian
nationals and referring cases beyond its capacity to UNHCR.94 At the time of the LFIP’s
creation, the ruling conservative Turkish Justice and Development Party was still in
pursuit of EU accession, and so the law was created with the EU asylum acquis in mind.
The Council of Europe, UNHCR, and international governmental and nongovernmental
organizations participated in its formation, demonstrating a more comprehensive
approach to migration and asylum that fit a contemporary context.95
The LFIP categorizes asylum seekers according to their country of origin and the
context of their flight. The Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR) went into force in
October of 2015 and was created in response to asylum seekers who arrive “in masses”
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so profound that their applications for international protection cannot be processed
individually.96 The Board of Ministers is responsible for determining which situations of
mass flight require Temporary Protection. The TPR was a direct response to the civil war
in Syria, which has forced over three million people into Turkey.97 Syrians are granted
long-term residence, protection from refoulement, freedom of movement, and certain
basic rights and services including healthcare, education, work permits, and financial
assistance, funded largely by the EU. Work permits are provided under the Regulation on
Work Permits of Refugees under Temporary Protection of January 2016, a subsequent
regulation under the LFIP framework. Some may laud Turkish lawmakers for such an
official response. However, the LFIP is only enforced by domestic law and lacks the
power of international standards of protection. So, there is no accountability mechanism
that asylum-seekers can turn to when they suffer abuses or cannot access basic
necessities. Neither are there international refugee rights for non-European migrants to
claim from the Turkish government.98 The circumstantial and subjective nature of the law
allows Turkey to evade a mandated response to other influxes of displaced populations,
opening the door to a discriminatory and selective application of the law. So, victims of
future crises and non-Syrians currently in Turkey may not be afforded the protections and
services they need.
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LIMITED PROGRESS

The LFIP has been praised for its proactive response to the Syrian crisis, as it
includes a cash transfer program, access to municipal services and regular employment,
and a large effort to enroll Syrian children in school.99 While it is commendable that
hundreds of thousands of Syrian children residing in Turkey can now continue their
education, the registration process is arduous and complicated, which prevents an equally
large population from enrolling. Exclusion and inequality are furthered as the legal right
to work has little benefit in a country suffering endemic unemployment, especially if
hiring managers are biased against certain groups.100 So, beneficiaries remain dependent
on humanitarian aid are pushed to find work in the informal sector where they risk of
abuse and deportation. Distribution of permits to temporary protection beneficiaries is
also a problem: only 26,000 Syrians have received work permits since January 2016, a
shameful number when compared to the over three million Syrians currently residing in
Turkey.101
The quality of application processing for temporary protection is also
questionable. Under the LFIP, officials are obligated to provide a detailed and justified
explanation for instances when a claim is denied However, grounds for refusal are left
undocumented. Furthermore, thirty thousand decisions were made in April 2016 alone,
yet Turkey has not demonstrated the institutional capacity to effectively take on such a
large volume of applications in such a short period of time, highlighting the probability
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that applications are not thoroughly and adequately reviewed. This demonstrates the
weakness of a strictly domestic migration and asylum framework, which proves
insufficient in its administrative and protective capacities.102
The LFIP’s provisions for accelerated procedures increase the possibility of abuse
and blatant rights violations. In 2015, Amnesty international reported multiple violations
of non-refoulement as many asylum seekers were forced to return to the country they had
fled from - including Iraq and Syria. There are reports that guarantees that interviews will
be administered and a decision will be made within thirty days and six months,
respectively, are disregarded. What is more, rejected applicants are denied the
opportunity to appeal, a protection afforded by the LFIP. Certain groups of asylum
seekers and irregular migrants may be detained, including those who submit false
documentation, are deemed a flight risk, overstay their visa or residence permit, cross
borders irregularly, or are denied protection.103 Detention can last for up to a year in
removal centers, presenting ample opportunity for a host of abuses including physical
assault, denial of the right to a lawyer, or inability to communicate with the outside
world.104

CONDITIONAL PROTECTION

Those who do not qualify for Temporary Protection apply for refugee status
through the UNHCR. They also apply for “conditional” refugee status under the
International Protection framework of the LFIP while they await UNHCR Refugee Status
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Determination (RSD) and resettlement. Turkey’s international protection system applies
to individual applicants deemed not to arrive “in masses” and consists of three further
categories. “Refugees” are European asylum seekers, the only population protected by
the 1951 Convention. “Subsidiary protection” applies to non-European nationals who
require protection from persecution but do not qualify for refugee status, conditional
protection, or temporary protection. Finally, “conditional protection” applies to nonEuropean, non-Syrian nationals granted residence in Turkey while UNHCR process their
claim and arranges third country resettlement.105
Non-Syrian nationals typically apply for refugee status from UNHCR and
conditional protection from the Turkish government. Given scarce financial opportunity
or available aid, resettlement in a third country is the objective of the majority of
migrants whose residence in Turkey is intended to be temporary. However, applicants
often wait years before they are relocated and report having difficulties checking on the
status of their case or accessing information on the application and resettlement
processes. The number of accepted applicants is consistently low. In 2016, the United
States accepted eight and a half thousand refugees from Turkey, yet by the middle of that
year there were approximately 328,000 active applications for asylum in Turkey.106
These numbers are even more concerning when one considers the fact that the United
States hosts 91 percent of Turkey’s resettled refugee population.107 Numbers are only
dropping: President Trump’s “refugee ban” was lifted in October of 2017, yet forty
percent less migrants are being resettled compared to when the ban was initially instated,
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and now Muslims only make up ten percent of this population. 108 In Turkey, the
majority of asylum seekers are Muslim, reducing their chances of being resettled.
Conditional refugees are forced into a state of limbo while they await UNHCR
action. This period is intended to last no more than six months, yet it often takes several
years. Unable to return home or continue to another country, they are indefinitely stuck in
Turkey unprotected and often without income or access to basic necessities. Furthermore,
most humanitarian efforts are geared exclusively toward the Syrian population, ignoring
the more than three hundred thousand non-Syrians, whose conditional status already
offers little.109 For example, the UNHCR Regional Winter Assistance Plan provides cashassistance and pre-loaded debit cards to buy basic necessities during cold winter months,
yet these potentially life-saving services are only offered to Syrians and Iraqis.110 Barriers
to even minimal subsistence not only threaten safety, they also contribute to one of the
largest obstacles migrants face: integration. They are forced to exist externally from
Turkish society and language barriers prevent gainful employment or even the ability to
complete an application for a work permit. Social immobility, dangers to human rights
and security, and the belief that conditions in countries of origin will not improve soon
offer little reason to remain in Turkey and should be considered contributing factors to
irregular migratory flows to Europe, which Turkish law has been unable to stop thus
far.111 From this we see that the basic structural framework of the LFIP is flawed. Until
migrants no longer believe staying in Turkey endangers their wellbeing, confines them to
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destitution, or inhibits their right to seek asylum, Turkey will remain a transit destination
rather than a place of long term residence.
Syrians receiving temporary protection may register in any city they choose and
refugees are granted the right to freedom of movement within state territory under Article
26 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.112 Conditional protection applicants, in contrast,
must register in Ankara through the UNHCR Association for Solidarity with Asylum
Seekers and Migrants (ASAM). Next, they are assigned to one of sixty two ‘satellite
cities,’ which are designated municipalities that accept non-Syrian asylum seekers and
are ‘open’ on a rotational basis so as to prevent congesting local public service
institutions. Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir, Turkey’s three largest cities, are not satellite
cities and are therefore inaccessible to conditional refugees. Until resettlement, leaving
one’s assigned city without permission is prohibited and regular check-ins with
authorities are required. To leave the city’s limits, one must apply for a travel permit,
which is typically granted only for UNHCR interviews or infrequently for medical
reasons.113 This selective confinement, made possible by the constraints of the LFIP and
by denying international refugee protection, presents a variety of dangers to asylum
seekers, who are confined to ‘undesirable’ territories suffering crowding, scarce
resources, weak law and order, and competition for menial labor.
Asylum seekers often flee their country of origin with no material possessions, or
the little they do have is given to smugglers to pay for their journey to a country of
asylum. It is common for migrants to arrive in Turkey without money or identification.
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However, applicants for conditional protection must independently arrange and fund
transportation to their assigned satellite city, where they will register with the Provincial
Directorate of Migration Management (PDMM). Upon registration, one must provide a
residential address where their identification card (kimlik) may be sent. Receiving the
kimlik can take anywhere from days to months, but conditional refugees cannot access
healthcare or education without one in their possession. Therefore, they must
immediately find housing and a means to pay for it if they wish to enroll their children in
school or get medical treatment.114 So, while the Turkish government claims they offer
registered migrants free or almost-free healthcare and primary and secondary education,
they are inaccessible to a large portion of this population. The inability to obtain
resources necessary for basic survival in satellite cities can force asylum seekers to reject
the international protection system entirely or violate the conditions of their conditional
refugee status by leaving the city’s boundaries without permission, working without a
permit, or relocating to a large city. Others decide to pursue asylum in Europe on their
own terms by working irregularly until they can afford a smuggler. In sum, Turkey’s
protection framework is rendered useless if it fails to actually offer basic protections or
necessities and instead holds its ‘beneficiaries’ hostage to dangerous circumstances where
they have no choice but to either break the law to survive or seek out dangerous paths to
asylum.
Even though almost no one arrives in their satellite city equipped with a steady
income, a place to stay, or sufficient funds to pay the upfront cost of rent, conditional
protection applicants and beneficiaries are required to independently finance their
transportation, find housing, and afford rent and basic necessities like food and fuel to
114
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keep warm during winter. In addition to restricted movement and the difficulty of
obtaining basic necessities, temporary and conditional protection beneficiaries are
ineligible to apply for a work permit until six months after submitting their initial
application for protection. They may only work in their initial city of registration or
assigned satellite city, and even then applications are frequently denied or “lost” in
clogged bureaucracies.115
Turkish authorities from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security will not
consider permit applications without a secondary application submitted by the employer,
along with a balance sheet from the previous fiscal year certified by tax officials.
Furthermore, work permits are only granted to individuals hired by businesses that
“employ at least five Turkish nationals for every foreign employee.”116 These barriers
make finding employment, particularly by small business owners, almost impossible and
push conditional refugees into further danger by forcing them to pursue irregular work.
Migrants are vulnerable to abuse without any possibility of seeking legal or medical
protection as irregular work violates the conditions of their stay and puts at risk of
deportation. Without income, however, conditional migrants are more likely to
experience homelessness, malnutrition, illness and violent crime. Obstacles to safe work
and a sustainable income are only some of the vulnerabilities that come with working in
the informal sector and can easily drive irregular movement to neighboring countries and
should be considered push factors for transit migration.
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URBAN CENTERS, DISCRIMINATION AND VIOLENCE

Turkey’s sixty two satellite cities and twenty one refugee camps do nothing to
overcome the virtually insurmountable obstacles that prevent integration and self
sustainability. And so, migrants relocate to large urban centers in search of basic
resources and employment. Ninety percent of Turkey's 3.3 million ‘people of concern’
(asylum seekers, refugees and stateless people) reside Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, none
of which are satellite cities and so are otherwise formally inaccessible to conditional
refugees.117 These cities are disproportionately affected by population influxes as the
support systems in other regions prove ineffective and inefficient. However, they have
their own dangers, as one of the largest threats to migrants is civil society. Migrants may
be attracted to their heterogeneous composition, yet diverse and densely populated urban
centers increase the chances that identity politics will develop into violent ideological
clashes.
Migrants enter an already fractured and struggling civil society while being
simultaneously constrained by policy frameworks that prevent integration. This increases
the likelihood that migrants will be regarded as unwelcome outsiders. Marginalized
groups such as the Kurds already feel ignored and targeted by the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) under Erdoğan, a president who many Syrians regard as their
savior for the Syrian-focused initiatives established under his administration, including
the Temporary Protection Regulation, targeted aid programs, and funding from the EUTurkey deal.
Many claim Syrians receive preferential treatment from public institutions.
Meanwhile, feelings of exclusion among minority groups are exacerbated as they witness
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the impacts of population influxes on their urban communities, including heightened job
competition, increases in the cost of rent, strained public service institutions, and
overcrowded schools, hospitals and public transportation. In other words, resentment of
political leadership is often acted out through a hatred of migrants. It does not help that
the Turkish Treasury allocates funds to the country’s municipalities in proportion to the
number of Turkish citizens.118 Clearly this framework was created without considering
the possibility of influxes of migrants, presenting further strain on large cities with
significant refugee populations. Opportunist politicians use this as an opportunity for
political gain by creating tension between migrants and civil society and establishing
xenophobic electoral platforms that appeal to feelings of injustice and resentment. This
tactic is gaining popularity in anticipation of the 2019 elections and produces hostile
environments characterized by inter-ethnic and inter-communal rivalries.119
It is an unfunny irony that many fleeing persecution in their home country arrive
in Turkey only to experience continued discrimination for similar or different reasons
related to identity, ideology, culture, or appearance. It is important to recognize the
vulnerable among the vulnerable. In Turkey, LGBT people, single women, Africans,
Christians, and victims of sexual or gender violence face particular risks. Gay and
transgender people are denied work, housing and medical care and often experience
violence. Africans report rampant racism and Christians cite exclusion and lack of access
to religious services. Single women are more likely to suffer sexual assault and single
mothers are forced to choose between staying with their children and finding work. It is
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also reported that the Turkish government and aid organizations do not offer adequate
medical, legal or psychosocial support to victims of sexual and gender-based crimes.120
The tension between citizens and non-citizens is widening the existing schism that
divides Turkish society along political, social, and economic lines and contributes to
growing civil discrimination against migrants. When compared to the same period of the
previous year, there were three times more incidents of anti-migrant violence in the
second half of 2017 and thirty five related deaths. Municipal leadership is reluctant to
solve these problems and improve support and integration services, fearing backlash from
their constituents and hoping unsavory urban environments will push migrants out or
encourage voluntary returns when circumstances allow.121 It is crucial to note here that
integration is a false policy objective. It is a deception propped up by platitudes and
ineffective programming designed earn the favor of those who “matter” (i.e. the EU and
UN) and deter unwanted populations. However, inaction may cause even greater
inflammatory responses and electoral repercussions as citizens witness continued strain
on local institutions and compete with migrants for low wage jobs. Leadership is failing
to realize frustration towards migrants can easily transform into a rejection of current
political leadership.
In sum, discrimination and lack of opportunity in satellite cities encourage
migrants to relocate to urban centers in hopes of inclusion and social mobility. Upon
arrival, most encounter greater risks of violence and little access to work or resources.
And so, migrants continue to leave. This phenomenon, constructed in part by the LFIP,
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has two primary effects. First, migrants are encouraged not to register upon arrival or to
violate the conditions of their stay by relocating or working illegally. Irregular status
makes it impossible for aid programs to identify and target people in need, deters
migrants from seeking humanitarian assistance or legal protection, and prevents access to
public services. Second, denying basic necessities for subsistence forces migrants to exist
externally from Turkish society where they are vulnerable to deportation and abuse. All
of these factors largely contribute to irregular transit migration.

CONCLUSION

Conditional and temporary protections are defended as sufficient replacements to
fill the void created by the incomplete adoption of the 1951 Refugee Convention. This
substitution cannot be justified. The 1951 Convention includes provisions for family
unification and a path to citizenship, while the LFIP does not. It is also a fundamental
part of an international rights framework that offers protection through international
oversight. By not being party to the convention migrants are unable to claim rights from
the Turkish government and the country is able to act according to a domestic code.
Reluctance to lift the geographical limitation and continuous human rights abuses are
evidence enough to disprove the claim that the LFIP can substitute the convention.
Instead, the LFIP is a device that provides a level of service acceptable enough to allow
international actors to turn a blind eye, relieving them of their responsibility to intervene
or pressure Turkey to rise to international standards and grant refugee status to nonEuropean asylum seekers, an otherwise global norm.
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The legislation confines migrants to dangerous, subhuman, degrading, and often
violent conditions with virtually no opportunity for integration or upward mobility. It is
riddled with catch-22s that force migrants to violate the conditions of their stay or seek
irregular employment in order to gain access to public services. For example, conditional
refugees are required to pay for their own transportation, housing, and basic necessities,
yet cannot apply for a work permit for the first six months. Furthermore, a kimlik is
required to access public services such as education and healthcare, but one must provide
a residential address, and therefore be able to afford rent, to receive their kimlik. Such
conundrums make it impossible for migrants not to violate the law.
The LFIP privileges some groups over others, denying aid to conditional refugees,
who are particularly vulnerable in comparison to temporary protection beneficiaries.
Certain minority populations are especially vulnerable and face frequent abuse with little
to no legal, medical, or psychosocial support. Public institutions are unprepared for such
population influxes and NGOs and local authorities are ill-equipped to provide adequate
services. Politicians intentionally insight hatred and xenophobia, exacerbating antimigrant backlash, widening societal divisions, and further preventing integration.
The LFIP was designed to help displaced people in Turkey in order to reduce
irregular migration to Europe, yet it fails to fulfill its mission. It is an unethical policy
framework that cannot be considered a justifiable mechanism for curbing irregular transit
migration to Europe, neither can it be praised for including education, work, and
healthcare provisions if such they are inaccessible. Promises for amnesty, protection, and
essential resources prove empty considering regular work and basic necessities are
virtually unattainable and integration is hampered by bloated institutions, convoluted
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procedures, a xenophobic social climate, and officials reluctant to remedy these
limitations. The LFIP is unsustainable because it hinders the wellbeing of its
beneficiaries, particularly conditional refugees, who have no incentive to stay in Turkey
but are nevertheless forced to, in circumstances that contribute to illegal activity and
prevent personal growth and cohesive communal development. Short-sighted policy
prescriptions that fail to meet the needs of the local context, address the root causes of
irregular migration, or offer sufficient access to resources or protections are unlikely to
curb irregular migration.122 Each of these limitations should be considered among the
many push factors driving transit migration through Turkey. Therefore, the LFIP is
counterintuitive to Turkey and the EU’s intentions of stopping irregular migration into
Europe. Until migrants feel safe and can achieve a sustainable livelihood in Turkey, they
will continue to seek out ways to reach Europe.

II. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
THE EU-TURKEY READMISSION AGREEMENT

Until recently, the prospect of accession to the EU dictated Turkish policy
development. Before considering granting Turkey membership, EU leaders required
harmonization on issues related to asylum procedures, border management, penalization
of irregular migration, combating human trafficking and smuggling, and full adoption of
the 1951 Refugee Convention. Turkish leadership reduced pressure for accession when
they realized the EU’s legal framework was an obstacle to the regime. However, in
March 2016, Turkey and the EU established a migrant readmission deal. By doing so,
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European leadership chose to prioritize security over human rights and turned a blind eye
to past concerns about rights violations and authoritarianism. Frightened by the amount
of irregular migrants entering the Schengen territory at the height of the refugee crisis
(720 thousand migrants were apprehended on Greek shores in 2015),123 European powers
saw Turkey as an opportunity to prevent the entry of unwanted populations. As stated on
the EU’s website, the deal is a direct effort to “strengthen external border controls and
reduce the number of asylum seekers.”124 There is no mention of any wish to protect
migrant rights, reduce the human cost of irregular migration, or provide a safer, more
accessible path to asylum.
With this agreement, Turkey would bolster its border security and all apprehended
irregular migrants and asylum seekers would be returned to Turkey, which would act as a
sponge preventing movement into Europe via Greece and Bulgaria. In return, Europe
agreed to grant asylum to one Syrian refugee for every irregular migrant returned to
Turkey.125 Turkey would receive three billion Euros to support its Syrian population and
enjoy visa liberalization in the Schengen territory. Accession talks would also resume,
provided Turkey made good on its promise to keep migrants out of Europe. Finally,
Europe offered Turkey a “privileged partnership” that would strengthen regional
economic ties and upgrade the 1995 Customs Union to facilitate cross-border flows of
workers and goods.126
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The EU’s commitment to its part of the deal has proven weak. As of February
2017, less than eleven months after coming into force, only 3,565 people were resettled.
This number is problematic when compared to the almost 2.8 million Syrians residing in
Turkey at the time and is a blatant disregard of Europe’s promise to provide access to a
timely and legal way to Europe.127 In reality, since the deal was established, irregular
migration is not even close to stopping and border crossings to Greece have only dropped
to pre-2015 numbers.128 Disputes over delays in payments to Turkey have tainted the
relationship and tensions run high as Turkish officials renew their demands for a path to
accession and still await visa liberalization.129
Turkey’s relationship with the EU is quite fragile and unfulfilled promises lead
President Erdoğan to threaten reopening the country’s northern borders with Greece and
Bulgaria. Meanwhile European leadership counters Erdoğan by threatening to withhold
pre-accession funding in light of human rights abuses and political instability.130 It is
clear the relationship is built on fear, manipulation and personal interest rather than
mutual cooperation, interregional solidarity, or a desire to protect migrants. Even if the
deal did work according to plan, it excludes the large population of non-Syrians stuck in
Turkey, many of whom have been waiting years for resettlement. This population is a
lesser-priority to European leadership and the Trump administration continues to lower
quotas and cut program funding, further reducing their chances of leaving Turkey
through regular channels.
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The chief concern of the Turkish government is to make sure the EU makes good
on their end of the deal and ensure that the interregional migration framework does not
become an obstacle to their increasingly authoritarian regime. Meanwhile, the EU
occupies a complicated position as it relies on Turkey to keep unwanted migrants out and
depends on the deal’s success to ease political tension in the region. Continuing to
withhold payment and refusing to grant visa liberalization or resume accession talks
could lead Turkey to open its borders and let migrants continue freely northward. If the
agreement survives such obstacles, however, Europe is effectively condoning a volatile
authoritarian regime while ignoring the many dangers migrants face in the country. By
continuing to return migrants to Turkey despite the cognizance that it is a dangerous
place for migrants, Europe is also violating the rights of refugees to non-refoulement as it
can be argued that insecurity and the reluctance of Turkish leadership to protect migrants
make readmissions a violation of this principle.131

REPERCUSSIONS: PUSH-BACK, DETERRENCE AND CONFINEMENT

The pressure on Turkey to seal its borders has drastic repercussions. Police
brutality is implicitly encouraged through ‘push-back’ tactics, a method of border
management that restricts people fleeing persecution from their right to seek asylum by
forcing them back into the previous country of transit or other countries through, often
through violent and degrading methods. Officials on the Balkan route have unleashed
dogs and forced migrants to stand naked in the freezing cold. Brutal beatings are common
as agents intentionally cultivate a climate of fear, using scare tactics to deter migrants
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from returning.132 Recently, there have been reports of Turkish border agents shooting at
Syrians to prevent them from entering the country and therefore claim asylum or apply
for Temporary Protection.133
The Balkan Route, which runs northward from Turkey to Greece, through the
FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Serbia to northwestern
countries, was ‘closed’ in early March of 2016. A popular humanitarian corridor known
to assist struggling migrants on their way from Greece to Germany was shut down,
roadblocks were established in northern Greece, and fences were erected along the
southern borders of Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, and FYROM. European leadership
claimed the closure a success, pointing to decreases in irregular migration. However,
transit through the Balkans continued with over twenty four thousand crossings within
the first five months of its ‘closure.’ The route did become more treacherous and
expensive, presenting lucrative business opportunities for smugglers. Detention camps in
Greece became overcrowded after absorbing thousands of migrants who crossed the sea
from Turkey or were turned back from the northern border. The subhuman conditions of
the camps further motivated migrants to pursue the Balkan route or search for alternative
possibilities, despite barriers.134
Migration flows were not halted, they were displaced. Central Mediterranean
crossings from Libya to Italy peaked after the closure of the Balkan route and have been
continuously high since.135 It is now the deadliest migration route in the world. New
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pathways were also formed and migrants began leaving Greek and Albanian shores for
Italy, circumventing Macedonia through Albania and Montenegro, and entering Bulgaria
directly from Turkey.136 The latter route was rarely attempted prior to the Balkan closure,
as migrants reported racism from ultra-nationalists and violence from vigilantes and
police officers. In 2017, Turkey followed suit, completing a 911 kilometer long fence
along the Bulgarian border and beginning the construction of a wall on the border with
Iran.137 Turkey is also initiating the process of erecting a wall on the Iraq border. While
leadership claims the barriers are an effort to combat human trafficking and terrorism,
they appear to be a direct response to the spike in alternative entries of refugees after the
Balkan route was closed. Ultimately, they reflect a desire to prevent entry on the southern
borders now that the inaction of the EU and U.S. is transforming Turkey from a transit
state into a state of indefinite and involuntary residence.138

D. CONCLUSION

Solutions will be found only by addressing the root causes of population
displacement and providing a safe, legal path to asylum. Push-back, physical barriers, and
violence do not stop irregular migration. Not only do these tactics violate the right to seek
asylum, the right to life, and the non-refoulement clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention,
they also contribute to displacement, aid the smuggling industry, strain response
personnel, and make migrants more vulnerable to violent actors and harsh conditions.
Nevertheless, the continued efforts to cross these routes by risking their lives demonstrate
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both their bravery and the desperate conditions in which they have been placed. While
Turkey is not fully bound by the Refugee Convention, it is constrained by the UN
Convention Against Torture and the laws of the European Court of Human Rights.
Furthermore, all EU Member States are obligated to uphold the rights guaranteed in the
1951 Convention, reinforced by EU law. Returning asylum seekers to a country with an
authoritarian government, rampant discrimination and antimigrant abuse, and limited
access to work, education, healthcare, or basic necessities for survival violates the rights
of refugees. Therefore, Turkey or any country that does not adopt the convention in full
should not be considered an acceptable place for refugees or asylum seekers.
As we have seen, the EU-Turkey Deal is problematic first and foremost because
Turkey is not a safe place for refugees.139 Turkey is not immune to the phenomena
discussed in chapter one, which repeatedly demonstrate that barriers to regular migration
and tough border security laws only increase smuggling rather than stop irregular
migration. The repercussions of these border policies are harmful. While the deal is
promoted for successfully decreasing the numbers of arrivals into Europe, it is crucial to
question at what cost.140 We should take caution to believe in success when “success” is
measured by the ability to bar vulnerable populations from their right to seek and enjoy
asylum. While irregular migration has slowed, there is no evidence that smuggling
activity has slowed with it. The first months of the deal saw an increase in deaths on the
Eastern Mediterranean sea route, perhaps in direct response to more militarized border
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security tactics that harm migrants, either directly through push-back and violent
apprehensions, or indirectly by motivating migrants to seek out more dangerous routes in
desperation to reach refuge in Europe.141
The absence of rights protections and the dangers present in Turkey provide little
incentive to stay and increased security at the borders may encourage taking more
dangerous routes facilitated by smugglers. Furthermore, the perspective that crises in
countries of origin have no end in sight makes migrants aware that their stay will not be
brief and encourages them to forge on to more prosperous and stable countries. In chapter
four, the human smuggling industry in Turkey is investigated, taking into account its
regional history, development, social and economic aspects, and its relationship with the
Turkish legal framework.
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IV. MIGRANT SMUGGLING IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

A. INTRODUCTION

Irregular access to Europe’s Schengen zone from Turkey is achieved through two
primary channels: the sea route to the Greek islands and the newer northern land route to
Bulgaria. Turkey is much closer to the Schengen zone than Libya, which is separated
from Europe by the central Mediterranean Sea, now the site of the majority of global
migrant deaths.142 However, closer proximity to EU entrance points does not alleviate
risks. Ninety percent of all irregular entries into the EU are facilitated by smuggling, and
more than half of all suspected smugglers were arrested at the Greek-Turkish land
borders.143 Over fifteen thousand individuals have died trying to reach the Schengen
Zone since 2014, whether in overcrowded dinghies on the Mediterranean or Aegean seas,
suffocated while hidden in sealed trucks, refrigeration vehicles, and oil tankers, or at the
hands of smugglers or traffickers themselves. Others who successfully arrive on Greek
shores have died in congested, unsanitary and dangerous camps while indefinitely
waiting for their claims to be processed. Furthermore, while arrivals during the first three
months of 2018 are less than half than what they were in 2017, the number of deaths has
reduced only slightly. So, the percentage of deaths as a portion of arrivals has increased,
and this extraordinary death toll demands investigation.144 As new global crises take
form, the war in Syria worsens, and destination states further restrict access to asylum,
demand for smuggling remains. Even if bolstering security were an effective method of
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slowing irregular migration and smuggling, the high death toll forces one to ask at what
cost.
As discussed in chapter three, current policy approaches such as militarized
border security, push-back, readmission deals, and substituting international rights
frameworks for domestic protection are ineffective for stopping irregular migration.
Rather, when migrants are confined to precarious circumstances without international
protection or the ability to gain asylum, they are implicitly encouraged to continue their
journey. Such policy responses are counterintuitive to states’ goal to stop irregular cross
border movement and eradicate the industry facilitating such movement. Instead, the
journey only becomes more expensive and dangerous by forcing migrants to take
alternative, less desirable and more difficult to traverse routes. If states successfully curb
arrivals from one route, they are not stopping irregular migration - they are displacing it
and increasing the opportunity for smugglers to profit off of this displacement. Irregular
migrants in Turkey overwhelmingly report seeking out smugglers when they do not have
access to legal channels to cross-border movement.145 In this way, migrant smuggling is a
state-created phenomenon that benefits from restrictive migration policies that drive
demand and increase costs.
The causes forced displacement are not going away, yet Turkey’s migration and
asylum framework is unable to keep displaced people safe, the number of people granted
asylum continues to dwindle, and border security is equated with keeping migrants out,
often through violent means. Instead of subjecting themselves to asylum frameworks that
either lack protection or present further rights abuses, migrants continue onward and seek

145

Ayslin Yildiz, Perception of "Smuggling Business" and Decision Making Processes of Migrants,
Norwegian Government, June 2017, 15.

69

out other means of reaching safety. This may mean working in the informal sector to pay
for basic necessities, medical care, or passage to a country offering asylum. Because
leaving is no longer easy, this typically means employing a smuggler to reach such
destinations when regular channels are denied. From a refugee’s perspective, employing
a smuggler is routine and fundamental to contemporary cross-border movement and the
asylum process.146
Because demand for smuggling rises with the danger and difficulty of the route,
one can assume that almost all of the migrants who died on the increasingly complicated
pathways through the Eastern Mediterranean were smuggled. The human cost is
shocking, yet Turkey and the EU appear unwilling to address the problem at its source.
They are quick to blame the deaths of thousands of migrants on people they characterize
as self-interested, violent criminals, yet fail to hold themselves accountable for forcing
migrants to employ these actors when they withhold the ability to reach safety in any
other way
Smuggling in the Eastern Mediterranean has a long history and benefits from
consistent demand. In this chapter, I explore the migrant smuggling industry in Turkey,
by focusing on its development, the nature of its operations, and its socioeconomic
structure. This clandestine industry has undergone fundamental changes in direct
response to state action. I will demonstrate how the industry has become more
professionalized and sophisticated in recent years. Contrary to popular rhetoric, the
industry, at least in the Eastern Mediterranean, is not dominated by large transnational
and hierarchical criminal syndicates and rather has an informal and adaptable social
dynamic that is continuously evolving in response to new obstacles. This, however, does
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not make smuggling less dangerous for migrants. I argue that there is a constant tension
between the professional, trust-based relationships that increase the marketability of
smuggling, and the industry's coercive nature, where migrants are vulnerable to
dangerous environments, rights abuses, and violence at the hands of state and nonstate
actors. Trust-based relationships, however, do not eliminate dangers, as smuggling is an
inherently violent activity. The chapter also demonstrates that Turkey and its neighbors’
policy responses to human smuggling address smuggling’s consequences rather than its
causes. Methods such as criminalization, push-back and direct physical dismantling of
materials, only exacerbate its dangers and increase migrant fatalities.

B. THE NATURE OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING
I. OPERATIONAL CHANGES

The facilitation of irregular migration has undergone drastic changes in recent
years due to developments in technology, spikes in demand, and new obstacles to cross
border movement. Each operation is unique and made up of multiple interactions,
transactions, and legs - each presenting its own dangers. The sea route from Turkey to the
Aegean islands is usually facilitated by loading some sixty migrants onto inflatable
dinghies or shoddy wooden fishing boats where one passenger is assigned to navigate.147
Migrants are also loaded into freight trucks or hidden spaces on buses, which traverse the
land border from Turkey into the Western Balkans via Bulgaria or board ferry boats
sailing to Greece and Italy. Suffocation and overheating are common as migrants are
squeezed into tanker trucks and airtight vehicles, where they are less likely to be
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discovered by authorities.148 However, such clandestine measures typically put migrants’
lives in further jeopardy. In August 2015, seventy one decomposing bodies were
discovered in a locked airtight truck in Austria that smugglers had driven from Turkey.149
In August of last year, a boat carrying twenty five smuggled migrants from Turkey to
Greece capsized; at least sixteen passengers died, including three children.150 This latter
incident shows that measures such as the LFIP and the EU-Turkey Deal have not
alleviated demand for transit migration from Turkey, neither have they stopped migrants
from employing smugglers to make possible what states otherwise deny.
The difficulties in crossing borders have “professionalized” the industry. While
operations are increasingly clandestine, marketing is more public than ever. Take the PBS
Frontline documentaries, “Exodus” and “Exodus: The Journey Continues” which follow
smuggling operations that are now broadcasted to the world. Whatsapp accounts and
Facebook pages list smuggling enterprises, advertising stock photos of luxury yachts and
glowing reviews from questionable sources. Reliance on social networking makes
business development ethnically- and linguistically-based and smugglers’ nationalities
and ethnicities typically mirror those of their clients. This makes marketing easier as they
can rely on word of mouth to promote their business within the ethnic community and
creates a higher degree of trust between the client and facilitator as migrants are likely to
prefer working with members of their ethnic community. Smugglers depend on this
dynamic to maintain their reputation and keep their business afloat. As the high death toll
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reveals, trust is often given where it is not due, and can be deceiving to individuals
desperate to escape precarious circumstances at home.151 Border restrictions make
smugglers indispensable, so coercion may not be so necessary with such high levels of
dependency. Dependency-based trust, however, does not mitigate risks, particularly when
dependency is fostered by state policy that intentionally makes safe passage impossible
While every operation is different, there are certain shared aspects. Contact begins
in countries of origin, where smugglers market their services through family, friends,
community, and social media.152 An “intermediary” establishes an informal contract with
the client after discussing the projected route and method of payment. The intermediary
then works out logistics with “organizers,” lower level actors who are physically present
to carry out the various legs of the journey. Then, transport begins. It is very rare that one
smuggler will facilitate an entire journey. Rather, from origin to transit and destination
countries, migrants are passed through a complex network of diverse actors and hidden in
warehouses, shanties, apartments, and vehicles along the way.153
Smuggling routes align with irregular migration routes, and are therefore
constantly changing. When speaking of irregular migration on the Eastern Mediterranean,
the use of a smuggler is an unspoken given for almost all cross-border movement into
Europe. Refugee crises of the 1990s first made smuggling a criminal concern in Turkey,
but before that it went largely unpunished.154 In 2008, forty percent of all arrivals to the
EU were facilitated through the Eastern Mediterranean Route, and numbers spiked again
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in 2010 with an increase in asylum seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan. With this new
demand, smuggling over the river Evros on the Greece-Turkey land border gained
popularity. At its height, over three hundred people were crossing the Evros every day. In
response, Greece erected border fences and Frontex launched a Rapid Border
Intervention Team (RABIT) to stop such entries. Nevertheless, the smuggling operations
continued and arrivals rose in 2011. Entries through Bulgaria spiked and sea routes
became longer and more creative as authorities tried to patch holes in the Greek
border.155 While the 2016 EU-Turkey deal drastically reduced the number of entries into
Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean, arrivals on the Central and Western
Mediterranean immediately spiked.156
Eighty five percent of irregular migrants enter Turkey with the help of a smuggler
and this number jumps to a staggering ninety nine percent for irregular exits to Europe.157
Furthermore, when comparing 2016 and 2017, there was a marked increase in secondary
migration, and the percentage of the Afghan and Syrian refugee populations using Turkey
as a transit state increased.158 These trends can be explained in part by rising insecurity in
Turkey, particularly for migrants. Furthermore Because the EU-Turkey deal transformed
border security operations, the prices smugglers charge have been affected. There is a
high chance of return to Turkey or detention in camps when traversing the Aegean Sea on
dinghies, so this route is now less expensive and less travelled than it once was. In
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contrast, it is more difficult than ever to continue northward from Greece, but demand to
reach northern Europe remains high. So, transport by the Balkan route is now more
expensive. The addition of the EU-Turkey deal to the LFIP has confined migrants to
precarious circumstances in Turkey, particularly because it is difficult to evade discovery
and returns when arriving to Europe through Greece. Therefore, operations now rely on
entry through Bulgaria and on larger vessels seeking Italian shores in an effort to evade
Greece.159

II. NETWORKS

Eastern Mediterranean smuggling networks are loosely organized, informal,
exploitative, and characterized by a division of labor and adaptability.160 While individual
operations may be complex and sophisticated, networks are not. When an operation is
dismantled and smugglers and migrants are detained, there is a rapid chain-like
communication among the various actors and a new route is quickly established. When
authorities increased controls in Edirne (a city and hub for smuggling located on the
Turkey-Bulgaria border) it only took a week for operations to shift to the Aegean sea
route, using yachts out of the port of Çanakkale, a lesser-suspected vessel, though more
expensive for migrants.161 Smugglers are accustomed to periodic checks on highway
routes, which only alert them to quickly detour. New vehicles are constantly employed as
well. According to an interviewed smuggler, “commercial panel type vehicles” are the
159
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new norm on Turkish roads, “if you see any panel van around here equipped with black
window films, you can be sure that it is used for smuggling.” Flexibility facilitates
navigation of growing the aforementioned operational complexities and allows smugglers
to readjust according to environmental and political changes. Adaptability has risen
notably since the Syrian refugee crisis.162
There is no evidence of a singular, dominating transnational criminal
organization, and hierarchical and mafia-like networks are not the norm.163 Smugglers
can be part of local or regional criminal groups, but it is more likely that they are
entrepreneurs who join a smaller network of individual actors who each play a specific
role.164 Networks are not strictly local, national or international. Smugglers extend their
operations and communications when necessary, and cooperate with a variety of actors
and locally-based groups through horizontally-structured relationships. The average
smuggling network in Turkey is made up of nine people, but they typically range from
anywhere between two and twenty actors depending on the scope of their operation,
contextual demands, and available capital.165 Demir, Sever and Kahya, compare the
networks in Turkey to multinational corporations, where

companies have part-time and full-time employees who have various
responsibilities such as administration, logistics, production and so on.
Companies work together and with subcontractors, sometimes both
nationally and internationally. All companies need marketing for their
products and services. They have customers, and customers make choices
from among a range of service providers. Choices are usually made
162
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according to the quality and price of the service and the product. The way
transnational migrant smugglers operate and conduct their illegal business
can be characterised exactly as above.166
This arrangement is also appealing for its cost-effectiveness, where business partners are
unlikely to exploit one another, extort funds, or adhere to a hierarchical organizational
framework. Such informalities make the industry accessible to new actors from all
backgrounds seeking financial gain. This can explain why the demographic makeup of
smuggling groups often mirrors that of their clients. Transactions are more easily
facilitated without cultural or linguistic barriers and displaced people often see smuggling
as an opportunity to sustain themselves.
Poverty is endemic in Turkey, particularly for migrants. For those living at the
borders and in transit hubs such as Istanbul, Edirne, Ankara and Ayvalik, smuggling is a
means of relieving financial burdens. One man defended his decision to take part, stating
“I was making 2,000 dollars per transfer. If I had a regular income, I would not do this
job. Otherwise, how would I raise my children?” Because demand for passage to Europe
is so high and the LFIP restricts work visas to an extent that makes gainful employment
almost impossible, smuggling presents a lucrative opportunity that displaced people in
Turkey otherwise wouldn’t have access to. This income can help struggling migrants
support their families and save enough money to perhaps find a reliable path to a country
willing to offer protection. So, while it is true that illegal industries can attract insidious
actors, one should be critical of sweeping claims of criminality. Just as asylum seekers
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have no choice but to flee, they also may have no choice but to temporarily take part in an
illegal industry in order to keep their lives and the lives of their families afloat.167
Scholars debate whether transnational migrant smuggling is organized crime or
“crime that is organized.” Smuggling is a “crime that is organized” in the sense that it is
complex, sophisticated, and often requires extensive planning between a large and diverse
group of actors. This does not inherently make smuggling ‘organized crime,’ which is
carried out by criminal organization that does not dissolve after the crime is committed
and is often involved in other criminal activities such as trafficking.168 There is evidence
that closer linkages are developing between smuggling activity and organized criminal
groups in Turkey.169 According to the International Organization for Migration, in 2016,
twenty-two percent of all suspected smugglers had a connection to drug trafficking, while
20 percent were linked to human trafficking and another 20 percent to property crime.170
Some claim there are clear connections with terrorist organizations.171 According
to Turkish officials, terror and smuggling groups have a mutually beneficial relationship,
where terrorists require the assistance of smugglers to enter target destinations and
smugglers depend on terrorists to provide protection and cross border areas and otherwise
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inaccessible regions.172 Rebels of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) are not only
responsible for domestic terror, they also are cited as “one of the largest criminal
networks in Europe and actively involved in the migrant smuggling currently occurring in
Europe.”173
Recent qualitative, interview-based data clashes with such previous accounts,
instead showing that migrant smugglers in Turkey are staunchly opposed to other
criminal involvement such as drug and arms trafficking. Migrant smugglers generally
seem deterred from partaking in other black-market activities, even though illicit trades
frequently follow similar routes. According to Demir, Sever and Kahya, “should any
other group already dealing in narcotics, for example, dare to become involved in migrant
smuggling, this could be seen as a ‘challenge’ and become a possible source of
conflict.”174 Potential stakeholders perceive migrant smuggling as less risky than other
illicit markets and large organized criminal syndicates are inherently exploitative and
present dangers to the personal safety of both clients and facilitators. Furthermore,
migrant smugglers have a higher degree of independence and are less likely to have to
share their earnings with other actors because networks are rarely hierarchical and
therefore there is no superior to report to. Avoiding other criminal activity also protects
smugglers from potential additional charges, which are often much more severe for
narcotic or sexual trafficking or for being connected to a transnational criminal
organization. Smugglers are dependent on client trust and make efforts to maintain it,
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even if it is undeserved. Migrants are more likely to hire a smuggler if they believe they
are not connected to an organized criminal group but instead are a benefactor of sorts
from their own ethnic community. Such actors appear “safer” as they may be more
willing to empathize with or protect their clients, who are likely at a lesser risk of
becoming victim to traffickers.175
Each of the social dynamics just discussed, including terrorist organizations,
mafia-like structures, and transnational polycriminal syndicates, may very well coexist
alongside the networks that try to remain strictly independent from organized crime. The
migrant smuggling industry is not one dimensional. Its complexities derive from the
various reasons why people join the industry or seek assistance for cross-border
movement. Social, political, financial, and geographical contexts further influence the
development of operations and networks. Rather than saying one structure is the singular
reality, one must consider the countless factors that make every experience unique.
Diverse involvement that includes violent actors, criminal and terror groups, and
impoverished and displaced people shows that a multidimensional approach to
researching and addressing smuggling is necessary. A further degree of complexity is
added when one considers the variety of factors that draw individuals to migrant
smuggling, including barriers to safe and regular work, inability to safely reach asylum,
and desperation to access the basic necessities essential to sustaining oneself.

III. ACTORS

As previously stated, smuggling in Turkey is characterized by adaptability,
horizontal relationships, infrequent communication among actors, less direct violence
175
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than with mafia-like groups, and limited experience. Such networks are made up of a
variety of actors, who are either “leaders” (or “planners”), “organizers” or “low level
facilitators.”176 The actor’s role often depends on the scope of his/her network. If you
have money, transnational connections, and extensive smuggling experience, you are
more likely to be a leader. Leaders are the operational head and plan the journey, arrange
transportation, and resolve any complications that may arise. They reside in metropolitan
cities that are transit hubs, such as Istanbul, and organize all transportation by working
with liaisons in origin, transit, and destination countries, and with nearby organizers.
Organizers’ jobs are more direct: they arrange transportation from hubs to ports and
towns on the western borders and for subsequent departure, and secure temporary
lodging.177 “Depositories,” or hawaladar, are in charge of the financial aspect of the
operation. They provide an “escrow service” and receive a commission for handling
financial transactions. They accept smuggling fees from migrants, which typically are not
given to the leaders until the operation is successfully completed.178
While leaders organize the operation, facilitators engage in its direct facilitation
while in communication with organizers. The majority of smuggling arrests are of
facilitators and therefore do little to dismantle the network, particularly because leaders
protect themselves by limiting communication. They are the land and sea transporters,
public officials and shelter providers. “Mountaineers” help migrants navigate Turkey’s
southeastern mountain regions on the Iran and Iraq borders. “Transporters” are the truck
drivers and boat captains who directly facilitate movement. These actors run the highest
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risk of arrest yet have some of the loosest connections with the networks’ core. Rather,
they are local people who may or may not be formally employed and use smuggling jobs
as a source of supplementary or primary income. They often are fishermen or truck
drivers whose vehicle or vessel is an asset for further financial gain. Escorts, guides and
lookouts are local experts who facilitate movement by supporting transporters. Shelter
providers rent out their space to provide temporary clandestine lodging to up to a hundred
people while they await the next leg of the journey.179 One of the greatest assets to
smugglers are public officials, including customs and border security officers, who accept
bribes to allow passage in some of the most difficult to traverse and heavily guarded
areas.180
Among this diverse group of actors there are certain demographic patterns. A
profile study of fifty-four migrant smugglers in Turkey found that all subjects were male
and the mean age is thirty-six, where the vast majority are in their thirties and forties,
married, and received no more than a secondary school education. Most are self
employed and work in fishery or transportation - an easy way of getting involved in a
low-level smuggling job. Eighty percent of smugglers interviewed had been in the
industry for less than ten years, while thirty percent have committed public order crimes
(theft, burglary), ten percent were involved in drug movement or distribution, and less
than ten percent had a record for working with mafia-like groups. Nationalities mirror
those of their client population, with smugglers coming from Iraq, Iran, Syria,
Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. While ethnic Kurds from Turkey have dominated the
179

Oguzhan Omer Demir, Murat Sever, and Yavuz Kahya, "The Social Organisation of Migrant Smugglers
in Turkey: Roles and Functions," European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 23 (August 6, 2016):
382-4.
180
Rob Wainwright and Jürgen Stock, Migrant Smuggling Networks: Joint Europol-INTERPOL Report,
Europol, INTERPOL, May 2016, 8.

82

industry, Syrians have a growing stake and their presence grew eightfold from 2013 to
2014.181 These populations are some of the most marginalized in Turkey and the growing
Syrian presence gives rise to the question of whether Temporary Protection provisions
are doing enough to keep Syrians afloat. According to some of the subjects interviewed,
in border communities most families are involved in smuggling in one way or another,
each with their own role. In this way, smuggling is normalized and not viewed as
“criminal” among locals, even though it is illegal.182

IV. PAYMENT

The multibillion dollar smuggling industry’s profitability is due to the high
demand and low costs of operations.183 The cost of transport depends on multiple
variables and is paid in installments for each leg or one in lump sum. Typically, the
smuggler and client agree that payment will be transferred upon safe arrival, which
prevents robbery and exploitation and presents the opportunity for multiple attempts
should the operation fail.184 Migrants report extortion, forced labor, and threats to their
family’s lives if they fail to pay the full amount upon arrival.185 Payments are either given
to trusted loved ones in origin or transit countries, to a hawaladar, or placed in a
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password protected safe box until arrival in the destination country.186 The length of
distance, number of border crossings, mode of transportation, official checkpoints and
barriers, landscapes, and weather all affect the complexity and therefore the cost of the
journey.187
Generally, price increases with demand and the costs, obstacles and risks
presented to smugglers. In contrast, if a route is particularly dangerous to migrants, it
may cost less, especially if a smuggler is not present. For example, prices for sea
crossings are lowest during winter months in spells of bad weather via inflatable
dinghy.188 However, arriving to Greece or Italy from Turkey in summer months aboard a
yacht is quite expensive (up to EUR 6,000), particularly if the ship is not crowded to
dangerous capacities.189 This is because in winter months demand is low and smugglers
do not accompany these journeys, so the only real risk is to the migrants themselves.
Entering Turkey is quite cheap (USD 100) in comparison to the fees required to exit,
which range anywhere from USD 500 to EUR 20,000.190 The predominant trend in recent
years has been the steady rise in costs. In 2016, seven percent of Syrian respondents
reported their journey cost over USD 5,000, while in 2017 this number jumped to fiftyseven percent191 as a result of new obstacles and risks thanks to policy initiatives such as
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increased coast guard patrols, highway checks, dismantling of sea vessels, border walls,
and other push-back techniques.

V. DANGERS

Professionalization and technological advancements have not made smuggling
any less dangerous. While Demir, Sever and Kahya argue that “migrant smugglers rarely
use violence in Turkey” the high death toll and endless accounts of abuse, violence and
exploitation show violence, or at the very least, risk of violence, is inherent to the
activity. Even if a smuggler does not directly physically abuse his clients, violence is
inherent to the nature of smuggling. Threats to safety are environmental, structural, and
are presented by state and nonstate actors.192 A smuggler can pride himself on never
laying a hand on one of his clients, yet the inflatable raft he sent from Turkish shores
yesterday may have capsized on its way to the Aegean islands, killing all of its
passengers - an all too frequent scenario. Thousands of migrants have been killed in
tankers, vans, trucks, ships, rafts, and “safe houses” in recent years. They continue to
suffocate in airtight vehicles and drown on the Mediterranean in startling numbers and
risk kidnapping, trafficking, and forced sexual and manual labor. Furthermore, while
state actors condemn smugglers for violent practices, violence directly from state actors
is also common, particularly on smuggling routes such as the Balkan where asylum
seekers are treated as unwelcome criminals. Physical and verbal abuse are common, there
are multiple reports of asylum seekers being shot at on Turkish borders, and migrants live
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in constant fear of Greek officials; one interviewee stated, “the Greek police hate human
beings.”193
A recent IOM report cites frequent aggression, violence, and disrespect from
smugglers.194 Coercive violence is intrinsic to migrant smuggling in the Eastern
Mediterranean. According to Baird there are four types of violence involved in human
smuggling enterprises: “threats and pressure, physical force, deception and fraud, and
coercion/advantage taking.” Such violence serves a variety of purposes including, “to
assert control, to discipline the group, to enforce ad hoc rules, to coerce those who may
be unwilling to move, to collect payment, or to sexually abuse or rape women.”195 In a
2012 study of migrants smuggled from Turkey to Greece, one third of respondents said
they experienced physical force during crossing, over one half said they felt exploited, ⅓
said they were threatened or pressured and another third had been “deceived or defrauded
by smugglers.”196
Sexual abuse and rape are common and are substituted for unfulfilled payments,
and the particular vulnerabilities women face may explain why women report feeling
taken advantage of more than men. However, respondents overwhelmingly claim that
they feel financially taken advantage of more than anyone else. Robbery is so common
that it is to be expected, and can occur before and during the journey. Some may invest
all of their savings in a smuggler only to never hear back from those who promise them
safe passage to a country of asylum. Extortion is common as well, and migrants are
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deceived into thinking they have arrived in the EU, only to find themselves in Eastern
Turkey.197 These findings are even more startling when one considers the fact that these
people are unprotected by the 1951 Refugee Convention while in Turkey, so there is no
rights framework in place to turn to in cases of abuse.
If there is in fact “strong interpersonal trust between smugglers and those
smuggled in Turkey,”198 and if violence is rarely used, as Demir, Sever and Kahya claim,
this does not eliminate the violent and threatening nature of smuggling. One can argue
that statements such as these are counterproductive and deceptively convey an image of
circumstances free of coercion, insecurity and malice. They ignore the countless other
dangers and the fact that part of the danger in smuggling is not whether or not violence
takes place, it is that the door for such violence is left wide open.
My research reveals a tension between these trust-based networking and
marketing strategies and the fact that smugglers are not trustworthy. The problem here is
that migrants have no other choice but to trust these actors. What is perceived as trust is
more likely to be coercive circumstances that give migrants no option but to place their
lives in the hands of such suspicious actors. Co-ethnic community may make this
decision easier, but migrants trust such actors with their lives because they have to.
Arguing that migrants have agency in these decisions can move culpability from the
smuggler to the smuggled. This noun disregards the level of desperation one must reach
to enter such a contract and encourages a criminal perspective of migrants.
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C. STATE RESPONSES TO MIGRANT SMUGGLING IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Despite the proclaimed intention of stopping migrant smuggling and irregular
migration, state responses have done the contrary, aiding the industry, increasing its
profitability, and exacerbating risks migrants face by driving demand for. Strategies that
overwhelmingly invest in border security and surveillance force smugglers to
professionalize their business model, making operations more organized, but less safe.
Although recent data on smuggling at the Turkish-EU borders is limited, the literature
shows that violence and fatalities rise with increases in border security and the death toll
on the Eastern Mediterranean climbed in the first half of 2016 compared to the first half
of 2015, despite the accumulation of anti-smuggling measures over previous years and
during a period when both Turkish and EU forces were drastically increasing their
security presence on Eastern Mediterranean waters.199 Turkey has worked closely with
the EU to address regional smuggling activity through new legal frameworks and direct
intervention. In this section I bring attention to anti-smuggling developments in Turkey
and Greece and their effects and broader implications. Because these measures fail to
address the causes of smuggling and demonstrate a disregard for the safety of migrants
and their right to seek and enjoy asylum, they will continue to prove ineffective in
dismantling the migrant smuggling industry in the Eastern Mediterranean.
I. TURKEY

Similar to its approach to irregular migration, Turkey’s anti-smuggling efforts in
recent decades were developed to harmonize with the EU migration and asylum acquis.
The Turkish government established the National Defence Force to Combat Human
199
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Trafficking under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Department of
Combatting Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking under Turkish National Police.
The former works with the Ministry of Interior’s Department of Anti-Smuggling and
Organized Crime and the Department of Foreigners, Borders and Asylum to address
domestic and international smuggling activity and engage in smuggling-related
research.200 The latter is made up of fifty central officers and has offices in regions with
high levels of smuggling and trafficking activity. Officers were meant to coordinate with
local law enforcement, but corruption, complicity, and a lack of international cooperation
prevented substantial action.201
In an effort to align with the global legal framework dealing with smuggling and
trafficking, Turkey adopted the UN Palermo Convention and its Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons in 2003, and with it a broader definition of
“smuggling” and stricter penalties for involvement to be implemented in reforms to the
Penal Code in 2005.202 The 2003 Road Transportation Law of the Penal Code states that
in cases where a vehicle is carrying irregular migrants and the driver is sentenced on
smuggling charges, the driver’s transportation permit will be suspended for three years
and the vehicle will be seized.203
Smuggling is legally defined and addressed first and foremost by Article 79 of
the new Turkish Penal Code Law No. 5237 (June 2005). According to the code, a migrant
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smuggler is “any person who, by illegal means and with the purpose of obtaining, directly
or indirectly, a material gain: a) enables a non citizen to enter, or remain in, the country,
or b) enables a Turkish citizen or a non citizen to go abroad.” Smugglers are sentenced to
three to eight years in prison and up to ten thousand dollars in judicial fines. Penalties
increase if smuggled persons are subjected to dangerous circumstances or degrading
treatment, or if the smuggler is found to be a part of a criminal organization.204 In 2010,
Article 79 was amended so that even unsuccessful attempts at smuggling will be
prosecuted to the full extent of the law.205
In 2015, there were seventeen times more irregular arrivals to Europe than the
previous year, partially due to the large influx of Syrian asylum seekers, with around
885,000 internationally displaced people entering through the Eastern Mediterranean
alone, most by the sea route to Greece, then northward through the Balkans. In response,
the presence of national and regional border officials multiplied on Greek and Turkish
shores and surveillance and security measures were strengthened. This spike in arrivals
pushed the EU to create a Common Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling (COM
(2015) 285) and invest more resources into militarized counter smuggling tactics, but not
to help asylum seekers find safer ways to enter.206 The EU border agency Frontex
increased their presence on Greek and Turkish waters by deploying more sea patrols,
namely Poseidon Rapid Intervention in December 2015. According to Frontex, the
purportedly anti-smuggling mission was in response to “large numbers of third-country
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nationals trying to enter the territory of a Member State illegally,”207 demonstrating a
strong motivation among EU Member States to keep migrants out. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) also established themselves on the Aegean sea, employing
militarized security tactics to dismantle smuggling operations and return migrants to
Turkey.208 In January of 2016, Turkish and German special forces collaborated in
Operation Wave, which led to the arrest of a grand total of fifteen smugglers.209 While
such anti-smuggling measures were implemented throughout the course of 2015 and
2016, there was simultaneous spike in the number of migrant smugglers in the region.210
As discussed in chapter three, Turkey has erected a 911 kilometer long wall on
the Syrian border, one of the longest in the world, to deter irregular border crossings and
smuggling operations. At the same time, the EU has made it more difficult for Syrians to
obtain a visa for sea and air travel into Europe, Turkey’s western borders are heavily
monitored, and the EU-Turkey deal gets rid of any possibility for Syrians to claim asylum
if arriving irregularly from Turkey.211 Syrians already relied on smugglers to traverse
Syria’s interior, but now more than ever smugglers are needed to leave the country. The
inability to reach Europe through regular channels due to the combination of policy
measures such as visa restrictions physical measures such as walls along the Turkish
borders, readmission, and other push-back methods such as gunfire and dogs, encourage
irregular transit migration through Turkey and drive demand for smugglers.
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II. GREECE

Poor treatment of asylum seekers is not unique to Turkey, even though Greece
adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention in full. Greece is notorious for its broad legal
application of the term “smuggling.” While the UN definition stipulates the need for
financial gain, this is not the case in Greece. Any person can be arrested for smuggling
for facilitating irregular border crossings, with a standard sentence of ten years. There is
no legal distinction between facilitation of irregular stay and irregular entry; both are
considered smuggling. The only exception is for circumstances requiring the assistance of
a person whose life is in immediate danger. Because Greece does not require the presence
of financial gain for facilitated border crossings to be considered smuggling, many more
people are at risk of arrest, including asylum seekers and Greek citizens. Providing
lodging or transportation to asylum seekers, even purely out of humanitarian good will,
has lead to smuggling charges. Bus and taxi drivers have been arrested for smuggling for
allowing irregular migrants to board their vehicles, and lifeguards were arrested for trying
to locate a raft of asylum seekers in distress off of Greek shores.212
Asylum seekers sailing to and from Greece, particularly those assigned by
smugglers to navigational duties, can easily be accused of smuggling, arrested,
imprisoned, and potentially deported. Such circumstances risk violating some the rights
of asylum seekers, including the right to seek and enjoy asylum and non-refoulement.
Punishing the victims of smuggling and not the perpetrators is not only a violation of
some of the most basic human rights, it is also a gross misreading of the context of
irregular migration in the Eastern Mediterranean and poor policy that disregards the
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structure of the migrant smuggling industry and the causes for its development. The
diversity in approaches to migrant smuggling among states and Greece’s broad
application of the law makes consistent and accurate data collection difficult. In this way,
the already limited research on smuggling is made even more vague.
According to the European Union Court of Justice, the Greek asylum system
experiences “systemic deficiencies.” Although this ruling took place in 2011, Greece’s
methods for managing influxes of irregular entries continue to be insufficient and
inhumane.213 Irregular migrants smuggled into Greece are either turned back to Turkey
or brought to detention camps on the Aegean Islands until resettlement or return to
Turkey. Greek camps, described by a Syrian detainee as a “grave for humans” and “hell,”
are overpopulated with asylum seekers who face indefinite detention in subhuman
conditions. Asylum seekers suffer disease, injury, and lack of access to medical treatment
and other basic necessities. Migrants have died from illness, fires, and violence and some
even voluntarily return to Turkey - a testament to the hellish nature of conditions in
Greece. Overpopulation in Greek camps reached an all time high immediately after the
EU-Turkey readmission Deal became official, when Greece’s Asylum Appeals
Committees declared Turkey too dangerous for migrants. And so, all asylum claims were
temporarily processed in Greece. This opinion switched, seemingly without reason, in
June of 2016 and Turkey began to hear asylum claims again.214 This rapid change
without significant improvement in Turkey’s treatment towards migrants leaves one
questioning the motives lying behind the migration bureaucracy if the protection of lives,
rights, and dignity clearly is not the answer.
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D. CONCLUSION

Migrant smuggling on the Eastern Mediterranean is complex, ever changing,
increasingly profitable and in high demand despite decreases in the number of irregular
entries into Europe from Turkey. Each of these qualities are a direct consequence of state
responses, which neither address the central, most influential actors of smuggling
networks, nor the factors that drive demand for smuggling. Dismantling networks is
becoming more difficult as the majority of smugglers are not located within the EU,
eluding Member States’ reach.215 Because states are reluctant to address the causes of
smuggling (international population displacement, high demand to reach asylum without
regular means of doing so, lengthy waits for resettlement) they attempt to stop operations
directly by arresting smugglers as they arrive and dismantling or confiscating materials.
States also increase criminal penalties for smuggling as a means of deterrence, which
does little to substantially disrupt the industry. It is quite easy to observe that harsh
punishment of drug smuggling, human trafficking, and involvement in criminal
organizations has not even come close to putting an end to these activities.
One should also keep in mind the high levels of poverty and endemic
unemployment in Turkey’s transit regions, particularly for migrants, and the significant
financial gain smuggling presents. It would not be unreasonable to speculate that asylum
seekers in Turkey join the smuggling industry, just as they become involved in other
forms of irregular work, because they are otherwise unable to financially sustain
themselves or their families. Economic conditions for asylum seekers, particularly nonSyrians, have only worsened since the adoption of LFIP and the EU-Turkey deal, which
confine migrants to subhuman conditions in overcrowded and unsupported cities that
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offer little opportunity and protection. The inability to obtain a work permit and the
significant financial gain that smuggling offers encourage participation in this illicit trade,
a last resort for many migrants who fear arrest and deportation yet have no other choice
to support themselves. In addition to prosecuting smugglers and addressing larger
criminal involvement, states must look at the reasons why the industry is growing in the
first place. Smuggling will continue as long as people do not have access to a sustainable
income and migrants are unable to claim asylum or are confined indefinitely to dangerous
circumstances while they await resettlement.
Combating smuggling is ineffective when measures are also designed to restrict
the movement of asylum seekers. Rather than stopping smuggling, border security and
stricter migration and asylum policies have forced smugglers to attempt more
complicated operations. This increases the price of the journey, thereby boosting profits.
Furthermore, more complicated routes typically mean more dangerous routes as well.
The number of global migrants fleeing persecution and violence is not shrinking and
people are still desperate to reach safety in Europe, which offers a higher level of
protection and opportunity than many other countries. Yet, getting to these countries is
more difficult than ever as Member States continuously employ new methods to keep
migrants out and deny asylum. This drives demand for smugglers, who are forced to
transport migrants across more dangerous routes through increasingly precarious
methods. While reports of smuggling dropped nineteen percent in 2017, this cannot be
explained by a reduction in smuggling activity. Rather, advances in operative
sophistication only make their activity more difficult to detect.216
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Stopping smuggling by bolstering border security and violently deterring migrants
from entering present the possibility for multiple rights abuses. The right to seek and
enjoy asylum is a fundamental human right, yet push-back and barriers to reach asylum
disregards this right, particularly if migrants are already within that state’s territory.217 By
returning Syrian asylum seekers to Turkey once they reach Greek shores, states are
denying their right to seek asylum and often violate the right to non-refoulement. Because
resettlement rates from Turkey are so low, states cannot justify these returns by claiming
regular channels to asylum are available. Furthermore, understanding that Turkey is a
dangerous place for migrants who are not protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention,
states are violating Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention which prohibits
refoulement and Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It states:

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and
well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.218
As we have seen, none of these rights are guaranteed in Turkey. Non-Syrians under
conditional protection and unregistered migrants are in particular danger. Many
intentionally do not register themselves, knowing the limitations of government
protection and understanding these limitations, particularly to movement and work, can
be more dangerous than living with irregular status. These conditions make the prospect
of hiring a smuggler all the more appealing, especially given the long waits for UNHCR
resettlement, which often takes years.
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As Agnes Callamard, the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council,
argues, refugees and irregular migrants are victims of the arbitrary deprivation of the
right to life - an international crime. Under Article 3 of the UDHR, as well as Articles 6
(1) and 26 of the ICCPR, states have a legal obligation to protect human life without
discrimination, even in times of war or states of emergency. Furthermore, states are
required to investigate all deaths and disappearances effectively and with due diligence,
include the family members of the missing or deceased in the investigation, provide
reparations, and prosecute those responsible, whether state or nonstate actors. According
to the International Organization for Migration, more than forty-six thousand migrants
have lost their lives since 2000.219 Although these numbers give a rough estimate of the
number of casualties, they are incomplete. Many more cases each year go unreported and
there is a concerning lack of data on the direct and indirect roles of states and their
policies in instances of such violence and abuse.
While the right to life is the most fundamental human right, by observing the
sheer numbers of preventable mass casualties of irregular migrants during smuggling
operations, one can see that its scope, while legally universal, is practically exclusive and
subjective. States have demonstrated a “failure to prevent preventable, foreseeable
deaths”220 through migration and border security policies that demonstrate an intolerance
to migrants and a neglect of human rights in favor of migrant deterrence and direct,
physical dismantling of smuggling operations. A “deliberate intent” to harm migrants is
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not a necessary requirement for a death to be considered “arbitrary”221 and the failure to
investigate such instances is in and of itself a violation of international law. Through
policies that promote deterrence, border militarization, and push-back, states are
implicitly responsible for violating the right to life by consciously subjecting migrants to
abuses by border security agents and nonstate actors, as well as harsh environments and
dangerous activities.222
Lethal force at the hands of state actors is only one manifestation of the
deprivation of the right to life, but non lethal force can have the same consequences,
albeit indirectly.223 When maritime security forces dismantle smuggling boats, migrants
are loaded into increasingly unsafe vessels; when Greek coast guard patrols remove boat
engines and toss them into the sea, then turn vessels full of distressed asylum seekers
around, back toward Turkey; when responders refuse to rescue overcrowded ships
dangerously close to capsize because they do not want to be responsible for hearing their
asylum claims, the right to life is violated and people continue to die.
In conclusion, approaches to stopping migrant smuggling are proving ineffective.
In 2017, the number of reported smugglers decreased by nineteen percent from the
previous year. These lower rates of detection do not necessarily correlate with a
significant reduction in smuggling activity. Rather, they could also indicate that
operations are now more difficult to detect. Now, smugglers conduct operations out of
third countries and methods of transport are more sophisticated due to the various anti-
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smuggling initiatives throughout Europe and the Mediterranean.224 Not only have state
responses made smuggling more elusive, they have a tendency to exacerbate the inherent
dangers of smuggling while violating the rights of migrants. By hindering migrants’
pursuit of safety and asylum and denying fundamental rights to life and non-refoulement,
states are creating an increasingly dangerous black market industry and supplying its
demand. Therefore, states are directly responsible for many of the dangers displaced
people face; migrants are not only victim to circumstances in countries of origin, but also
to the legal-political structures of the countries from which they seek protection.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. MAIN FINDINGS

Manmade and natural crises in Africa and the Middle East have forcefully
displaced millions of people in recent years. Europe has comparable stability, equality of
opportunity, democratic values, and strong rights regimes that create a high demand to
reach this region. In chapter two I laid the groundwork for the following chapters by
discussing the development and foundational philosophy of the formation of European
Union – a direct response to World War II. I provided evidence of their commitment and
obligation to uphold human rights and humanitarianism in order to show how current
anti-migration/anti-smuggling responses that violate these foundational principles are not
practical for Member States. This is because the European Union identity was built on the
notion of human rights and protecting displaced people. The EU also prides itself for
offering free cross-border movement within the Schengen zone, given their philosophy
that the creation of a unified borderless international structure that respects human rights
would ensure that fascism could never raise its ugly head again.
In direct opposition to these principles, decades later the EU again began
increasing border controls that made access to the region more difficult than ever. It is for
this reason that in the early 2000s many scholars began to talk about how the region
became a “fortress Europe.” Today, this trend continues in a fashion that harkens back to
the World War II era. However, the desire to keep migrants out is now so strong that EU
Member States are turning back on this fundamental principle of free movement. The
geographical landscape is fragmenting and internal borders are beginning to resemble
external ones once more. When political leaders talk about the “migration crisis,” they are
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not speaking the unfathomable violence and suffering that has displaced millions of
people. Rather, from their perspective, the crisis is one that is caused by the people
wishing to seek refuge within their borders. To the grave misfortune of forcefully
displaced people, Member States have decided repeatedly to prioritize narrowly defined
conceptions of “security” and “European culture” over fulfilling their legal obligation to
uphold international human rights and refugee law. If freedom of movement, human
rights, and protecting displaced people are no longer primary concerns to Member States,
the EU is no longer functioning as it was designed or standing by its foundational values.
Therefore the failure of the EU to fulfill its moral-legal responsibilities is a direct threat to
its very existence.
In chapter three I investigated the tendency of EU Member States to elude their
commitment to “burden sharing” through the recent readmission agreement with Turkey.
While movement through Turkey was once easy and much safer, pressure from the EU
has forced the Turkish government to strengthen its border security. Human rights
abuses, refusal to fully adopt the 1951 Refugee Convention, the harmful Law on
Foreigners and International Protection, and political, social and economic turmoil make
Turkey an unsafe place for migrants. Restricted movement, forced confinement, and
lengthy UNHCR processing in Turkey make these circumstances even more threatening.
Desperation to leave Turkey and barriers preventing asylum and resettlement have
encouraged dependence on irregular methods to reach destination countries and caused
migrant smuggling to flourish. In this way, the interregional policy measures discussed in
chapter three, which were designed to keep migrants out of the EU, have actually
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encouraged transit migration to Europe and support the migrant smuggling industry as
explained in chapter four.
As shown in chapter four, the Eastern Mediterranean migrant smuggling industry
is complicated, multinational, and constantly changing in response to new policy
measures and security initiatives. Despite former research that characterizes smuggling in
the Eastern Mediterranean as a trust-based and rarely violent industry, I argued that these
sympathetic tones are harmful to migrants, considering smuggling is an inherently
dangerous activity that always opens the door to rights abuses, violence and uncertainty.
Increased security at borders and on popular routes to Greece and Bulgaria force
smugglers to employ risker methods in order to avoid being discovered. Routes are
displaced and new terrain is unfamiliar, increasing exposure to potential pitfalls.
Dismantling the materials smugglers use, most notably ships and dinghies, do not stop
smuggling, either. Rather, they reduce availability of safe and reliable vessels and force
smugglers to rely on poorly constructed and unseaworthy boats, hundreds of which have
sank while crossing the Mediterranean. Smugglers are also susceptible to many of the
risks their clients face, including violence, perilous environments, and arrest. For this
reason, as well as the increasing complexity of journeys, the cost of hiring a smuggler is
steadily rising, making the industry more and more profitable.
Despite the frequent appeals to the human rights discourse in anti-smuggling
measures introduced by destination states, there almost always is a secondary agenda.
Anti-smuggling actions double as means of curbing irregular migration, often through
violent means. These catch-all responses equate illegal facilitation of entry with illegal
entry, and smuggler with client despite the fact that irregular border crossings are not
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illegal when seeking asylum. Nevertheless, states choose to perceive and represent those
seeking safety within their borders as insidious criminals cheating the asylum system by
not “waiting their turn” in camps until their claim is processed. Chapter four
demonstrated how this logic completely disregards international human rights and
refugee law, which grant the right to seek and enjoy asylum, and ignores the fact that the
majority of asylum seekers in camps are living in subhuman and dangerous conditions
and experience shamefully long waits for resettlement.
My research has shown how the inability to safely seek asylum, confinement to
precarious circumstances, reliance on smugglers, and security-based migration regimes
present state-sponsored dangers. Migrants drown by the thousands on Mediterranean
waters and in the back of cargo trucks, and suffer homelessness in freezing temperatures.
They are unwittingly sold to traffickers for sexual and labor exploitation and are beaten
and shot at on Turkish and Eastern European borders. Rape, discrimination, and inability
to access work, food and urgent medical care are also problems that migrants face more
often than not. They are denied safety within the borders of countries that call themselves
global leaders in protecting human rights, and are arrested, indefinitely detained, and
deported to places that directly endanger their lives and wellbeing. Not only is this
immoral, it is a blatant violation of some of the most basic human rights and the
fundamental values of the European Union.

B. BROADER IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS

It is imperative that states address the complex causes of forced displacement, as
well as the reasons why migrants seek asylum through irregular means and employ
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smugglers. Protecting lives and upholding human rights should be the primary concern of
EU leadership and wealthier states should use their privilege to assist poorer and strained
states that receive the bulk of irregular arrivals. In order to maintain legitimacy and
protect their regime, rather than asking how to keep migrants out, leaders must question
how they can best uphold the rights frameworks they have constructed and are
accountable to. The central question should be, how can human smuggling be stopped
without violating rights or endangering lives, and how can states best prepare themselves
to respond to asylum seekers in a timely and humane manner to ensure protection and
safety while maintaining domestic and regional stability?
In this section I broaden the scope of my research to demonstrate the greater
implications of the European Union’s current approach to irregular migration and human
smuggling and then offer suggestions for improvement. First, I argue that current
responses to smuggling are ineffective because they do not properly address its causes.
Second, I address the need for transparency and improved information sharing with
migrants. Third, I explore the practicality and legitimacy of methods of deterrence,
offshore processing, and readmission deals designed to keep migrants out, all of which
contribute to route displacement. I then offer suggestions aimed at improving conditions
for migrants in Turkey. Finally, I call upon EU Member States to prioritize human rights
and humanitarianism in their response to the refugee crisis. Without politically sound
actions, the European Union’s legitimacy is undermined and very future is threatened.
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I. THE SMUGGLING RESPONSE

As discussed in chapter four, smuggling will continue to become more profitable
and dangerous as long as there is a demand. Eliminating this demand would require
granting asylum to many more people, either by increasing “good will” number of people
states accept from foreign camps, or by facilitating safe entry for those attempting to
reach their borders. However, as we have seen, it is clear that (European) states do not
wish to welcome migrants, particularly if they are coming from predominantly black or
Muslim countries. This could explain why the border militarization tactics discussed in
chapters three and four are the favored methods to combat smuggling. From the
perspective of Member States, increasing border security allows smuggling to be
addressed while simultaneously barring entry for irregular migrants. In regions where
such tactics are employed, we see continuously high death rates, revealing the fact that
the lives of migrants are worth much less to states than preventing their entry.
Fatalities, abuse, and persecution in countries of origin do not seem to spark
empathy among state actors, who are inclined to treat migrants as criminals. States all too
often refer to asylum seekers fleeing by crossing borders through irregular means as
“illegal” and suggest that those who employ a smuggler are somehow cutting in line.225
“Illegal” is a misnomer with dangerous consequences. As repeatedly discussed, asylum
seekers may not be prosecuted or penalized for irregular entry when fleeing a place where
their lives are in danger and cannot be considered criminals for being smuggled.226 Using
this rhetoric promotes a criminal perspective of migrants and xenophobic sentiments
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among political actors and the general public, which can transform into harmful policy
measures and anti-migrant abuse and discrimination. Furthermore, there is no “line” to be
cut. The populations that states resettle from foreign camps are voluntary and based on
good will, while they have an obligation to hear claims lodged by asylum seekers
entering their borders. Per the 1951 Refugee Convention, asylum seekers have the right
to claim asylum and states have an obligation to fairly hear these claims. This is both a
moral and legal concern: by refusing to hear their claims, states are violating international
law and are putting migrants’ lives in danger in the process.
We have seen that migrants seek smugglers when they are denied access to
destination and transit countries, particularly if conditions in transit locations are unsafe
or unpromising, or if resettlement takes too long. Asylum seekers often wait years in
Turkey in unfavorable conditions before UNHCR finds a location for resettlement.
Destination, transit and origin states must work together to provide safe and legal
channels to asylum in states that offer sufficient protection, timely resettlement, adequate
conditions in locations of temporary residence, and access to sufficient income and basic
necessities while awaiting asylum decisions and resettlement. Reception and processing
must be swift and legitimate and subsequent resettlement must be timely. Applying for
asylum must also be a transparent process, allowing migrants to have a full understanding
of each step, as well as their rights and the conditions of their stay.
Destination states must be willing to accept more asylum seekers and should not
discriminate based on their identity or country of origin. Language, cultural, and
intelligence barriers should not be used as a tool to take advantage of migrants or violate
their rights. As research has shown over and over again, when certain populations are
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neglected and illegitimately denied asylum, they do not simply return home. Rather,
instead of waiting for resettlement, they will attempt to reach destination countries by
employing a smuggler, often multiple times, until the receiving state hears their claim.
It is also the shared responsibility of Member States to assist their neighbors on
Europe's southern and eastern borders. Northern and western states that experience
significantly less migrant traffic should lighten the strain on transit and EU border states
by offering asylum to as many migrants as their institutions can support. They should
also establish means for safe cross-border movement within the EU, as migrants currently
employ smugglers to facilitate this movement for them. Opportunity for legal entry and
stay would reduce demand for smuggling. Potential options include greater possibility for
family reunification and wider distribution of humanitarian visas, particularly in Turkey.
Visa requirements should be made relatively easy to fulfill for persons in distress and
could follow similar eligibility requirements as the conditions for refugee status, but
include provisions for migrants fleeing climate change, natural and manmade disaster,
severe economic crisis, or who suffer medical conditions untreatable in countries of
origin.
Should conditions remain the same, irregular migration will continue. Therefore,
smuggling will continue, and strict border controls will make operations more lucrative
and dangerous. Migrants will continue to die and people will continue to be forced into
criminality by evading registration and engaging in irregular labor. Claiming the right to
asylum from persecution must not be a deadly obstacle course, particularly when people
are already extremely vulnerable after fleeing life-threatening circumstances in their
home countries.
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II. SAVING LIVES THROUGH INFORMATION SHARING

Addressing the issues stated above should be an immediate priority, but
reluctance to rethink policy approaches shows that change will be slow. However, if the
commitment to stopping smuggling and addressing humanitarian concerns is genuine, it
is imperative that immediate action is taken to reduce the immense human cost of
smuggling. Most migrants who employ smugglers are drastically uninformed about the
people they are hiring, the details of their journey, and the risks involved that are often
unique to each route. Smugglers can easily take advantage of their ignorance and
desperation in many different ways including extortion for money or labor, trafficking,
and physical and sexual abuse. This also makes it easier to use cheaper and riskier
methods of transport. They may lie about the length of the route, their location, or the
role of state actors. Migrants are frequently told they are in the EU upon arriving in
Turkey. They may be loaded onto an unseaworthy craft without sufficient fuel or
flotation devices, and told Europe is only forty five minutes away, when in reality the
journey may take days. Migrants are also assured they will be rescued immediately upon
entering Greek or Italian waters, when instead they drift for days, refused rescue, turned
around, or indefinitely detained in hellish camps without access to urgent medical care,
sufficient resources, legal representation, or access to asylum. All of this is considering
they do not drown first.
Certain regions, such as the Greece-Macedonia border, are known for violent
security tactics, while specific countries, such as Greece and Turkey, may have unsafe
detention facilities or be less willing to uphold rights. Some borders, like that separating
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Serbia and Hungary, are more difficult to cross and will likely result in harmful pushback, detention or deportation, while heading west into Croatia drastically reduces these
dangers. There are also certain times of the month or day where crossings are easier and
safer. For instance, if traffic is busy, security guards are less likely to check vehicles.
Warmer months reduce risk of capsize or hypothermia at sea, and border or customs
officials accepting bribes may be working during a particular time of day. Because the
smuggling market is competitive and easy to enter, monopoly of a single network is rare.
However, certain groups may be notorious for their connections with a trafficking ring or
coercive and dangerous tactics, while others are known for their efforts to offer relatively
safe services and protect their clients.227
Most information on smuggling and trafficking is withheld from migrants and
substituted with ominous yet vague warnings from untrusted officials who at most inspire
fear but ultimately do not reduce the need to employ a smuggler.228 Specific, relevant
information, however, is of immense value and should be readily available to migrants.
They should be allowed to know the nature of local smuggling networks and operations,
including routes and potential dangers. Furthermore political, legal, social and economic
conditions should not be a surprise. Migrants should be made fully aware of their rights,
relevant asylum and registration procedures, how to access resources, and any policies
that directly affect them. Dense and complicated material related to rights, policy and
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legislation should be translated and simplified to include the most relevant information,
and presented clearly with visual aids such as maps and diagrams when possible.229
Qualitative and comprehensive research is lacking in general, but local data
collection and knowledge about smuggling activity is plentiful among authorities and
response personnel, especially in Greece, Turkey, and Serbia.230 Local and national
authorities, NGOs, and research institutions alike must be encouraged to investigate
smuggling further, not only from criminological, security-based, or organized crime
viewpoints, but also in relation to social and organizational structures, human rights,
humanitarian need, gender, mobility, population size and demographics, reasons for
demand, and economic analysis that takes into market and business aspects.231
Although states are encouraged to take part in this project, they are unlikely to
participate as they see that it undermines state power, particularly in relation to security
and migration management. State control of information distribution without oversight of
an unbiased third party could also turn out to be unhelpful or even harmful as many
governments have an anti migration agenda. This is why civil society organizations and
humanitarian response personnel active in camps and transit areas are in a unique
position to increase safety and awareness when choosing a destination and how to get
there. Migrants should have the opportunity to ask questions and share their experiences
without fearing punishment, arrest or deportation.232 For this reason, state actors may not
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be fit for such a task due to political agendas and the unlikelihood that migrants will trust
public officials regardless on their intentions.
Some may criticize increasing transparency of smuggling operations and irregular
migration routes, arguing that information sharing only endorses their actions and
encourages migrants to seek out smugglers. The reality is, as long as the causes of
smuggling are not addressed, the industry will continue to flourish. Improving
transparency is not a path to legalization and does not diminish the gravity of the crime.
Rather, it allows individuals to make informed decisions about matters that all too often
have deadly consequences. Increased knowledge about smuggling will deter migrants
from dangerous circumstances or better prepare them to handle such circumstances,
drastically reducing fatalities, disrupting more violent operations or trafficking networks,
and reducing strain on public institutions such as hospitals, food providers, and law
enforcement.

III. DETERRENCE, OFFSHORE PROCESSING AND READMISSION DEALS

“Tough on migrants” stances with strict border security policies that treat asylum
seekers as adversaries rather than a humanitarian concern threaten the lives and physical
and mental wellbeing of migrants. As we have seen in chapters three and four, ignoring
immediate humanitarian needs and rights obligations and using deterrence as a means of
stopping arrivals to Europe and smuggling operations does not work and always gives
rise to harmful consequences. Border walls and fences, violent actors, treacherous
landscapes, unstable countries and unsafe camps do not stop smuggling. More
importantly, utilizing these life-threatening circumstances as a tool to scare migrants
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away from pursuing Europe through irregular means directly threatens their rights to life,
to seek asylum, and in some cases, to non-refoulement. Deterrence methods are a “false
and ineffective solution” that drives demand for smugglers and transit migration as
migrants refuse to remain confined to perilous conditions and dodge threatening border
security officers.233 Rather than deterrence, it is imperative that states address the
complex causes of forced displacement, the reasons migrants seek asylum through
irregular means, and the immediate medical needs of incoming populations. To do so, the
criminality of the smuggler should not be transposed onto the victim, which is much
more likely if a smuggler is not present when a smuggling operation is disrupted.
Offering financial and political benefits to persuade origin and transit states to
prevent migrants from entering Europe is another, newer tactic gaining popularity. The
EU-Turkey deal, which is discussed in detail in chapter three, was designed to keep
migrants out of Europe by enforcing stricter border controls, sending asylum seekers
back to Turkey, and increasing access to essential resources, facilitated by external
funding. Member States also promised to offer asylum through regular channels by
accepting refugees processed by the UNHCR in Turkey if Turkey kept its borders closed.
As we have repeatedly seen, such measures do not stop irregular migration or smuggling
and only encourage transit migration.
While irregular migration in the Eastern Mediterranean has decreased, this is only
a return to the numbers in 2012 and 2013, when migration and smuggling were already
significant concerns for European governments.234 Offshore processing proves ineffective
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at curbing irregular migration when processing locations are unsafe and gaining asylum is
neither easy nor timely. In Turkey, migrants suffer discrimination, abuse, poverty, and
wait years for resettlement. Already slim chances of resettlement are shrinking even
further as destination countries cut refugee quotas and exclude certain identity groups.
Selective application of the 1951 Refugee Convention is harmful as states have the power
to decide who is and is not worthy of protection, thereby determining which lives are
worth saving based on narrow definitions and subjective opinions. This leads to
overcrowding in camps, slow processing, and long waits for resettlements. We have seen
this with the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal: while all migrants are confined to
Turkey, only Syrians have the opportunity for resettlement under the agreement’s
conditions, while non-Syrian migrants do not have access to the same basic resources
within Turkey as the larger Syrian population. Although what Syrians do have in Turkey
is shamefully limited, this difference could make the difference between life and death
for many non-Syrians.
Furthermore, humanitarian funding to offshore processing sites is not a sufficient
response if not accompanied by regular, safe, and speedy paths to asylum. The concept of
“burden sharing” is fundamental to the EU’s design, yet in 2016 Member States only
hosted 2.3 million refugees. Compare this to neighboring Turkey, which hosts 3.4 million
internationally displaced people while suffering political, social, and economic
instability. Furthermore, it has not fully adopted the 1951 Refugee Convention, so nonEuropean migrants are unable to claim asylum from Turkey and are not offered
fundamental protections.
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The EU’s response to population influxes in Turkey has been particularly harmful
considering it is an unsafe place for migrants. It is therefore shameful that the EU, a
world leader in human rights protections, has made such an agreement with Turkey,
thereby implicitly condoning the government’s treatment of migrants and denying
fundamental rights protections. The EU cannot substitute their responsibility to provide
safe asylum with money. Leadership fails to consider the vulnerabilities within Turkey
and does not address any immediate concerns that may have arisen during flight.235
Member States, particularly those in northern Europe, must partake in equitable “burden
sharing” by receiving refugees from transit states and in first countries of asylum on
Europe’s southern borders in a timely manner. Moving forward, it is imperative that
states offer all forcefully displaced people equal opportunity to claim asylum and the
subsequent right to resettlement should not be transformed into a privilege only to be
enjoyed by certain groups.

IV. ROUTE DISPLACEMENT

Some suggest that state responses to asylum seekers in the Eastern Mediterranean
have displaced population flows to the Central Mediterranean. However, the number of
people from Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria (The primary refugee populations on the Eastern
Mediterranean Route) arriving in Europe from Libya did not significantly increase
between 2015 and 2016.236 A small diversion to the Central and Western Mediterranean
may be possible, though, especially because smuggling prices on the Eastern
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Mediterranean route are pricier.237 I argue that routes are displaced, but to a lesser
geographical extent. Journeys, however, are no less dangerous. Preventing cross-border
movement does not stop irregular migration. Rather, it forces smuggling operations onto
riskier pathways utilizing more dangerous methods. These inconvenient methods of
transportation allow smugglers to raise the prices they charge, increasing profits.238 There
is a consensus among scholars and political actors alike that smuggling is a constantly
evolving business. This is no coincidence; it is the direct result of state action. When a
border closes, operations shift to less familiar terrains with landscapes difficult to
traverse, violent actors, or border controls. Smugglers may not have the materials
necessary to safely transport migrants over these routes. Furthermore, intensified border
security initiatives that neglect humanitarian needs encourage more clandestine and
threatening methods of transport, such as overheated vehicles with little air circulation.
Examples of this phenomenon are numerous. Border fences between Turkey and
Greece displaced smuggling operations to Bulgaria or to the sea route to Greece in 2012.
Each of these routes are substantially more treacherous than reaching Greece by land.
The next year the border fence on Turkey’s border with Bulgaria was completed,
encouraging an even greater number to take the boat route. When the Western Balkan
Route “closed,” Macedonian border guards used violent tactics to repel migrants,
including rubber bullets, stun grenades and tear gas. On the Hungarian border, similar
tactics were used. Migrants and refugees diverted their path westward to Croatia until that
border was closed one month later, after which the Slovenian route was pursued and
migrants were forced to cross icy rivers and were left stranded for days at a time in the
237
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cold without shelter or medical assistance.239 During this time there also was an increase
in arrivals by boat from Turkey to Greece, Cyprus, Italy, and on the extremely dangerous
route to Romania. Boat arrivals to Greece subsequently decreased when migrants
discovered they would likely end up in the country’s notorious camps. On the western
border with Syria, armed guards and an extensive wall have also prompted Syrian
refugees to pursue Turkey through Iraq.240

V. CONDITIONS IN TURKEY

State responses that keep migrants out are particularly harmful considering
Turkey is neither safe for migrants nor does it offer refugee protection to almost any of
the 3.4 forcefully displaced people seeking refuge within its borders. As I have discussed
in chapter three, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the EU-Turkey
Deal exacerbate already precarious circumstances. To improve these conditions, Turkey
must first and foremost adopt the 1951 Refugee Convention in full. In the case that this
does not happen, the EU should not confine asylum seekers to a territory where they are
denied fundamental and where their lives are in danger, as doing so violates the principle
of non-refoulement. Turkey must also renegotiate the contents of the LFIP and ensure the
promises they make to migrants are carried out to the extent that they claim.
Conditional protection is a problematic aspect of the LFIP. It is justified as a
substitute for the articles within the 1951 Convention, but conditional protection often
does more harm than good. By separating non-Syrians and denying them often life-
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saving resources with the argument that they are not coming from situations of mass
displacement, the Turkish government is acting in a discriminatory way. They are
effectively saying that their suffering is lesser, and therefore worth less than those
arriving en masse; that because they are not arriving to Turkey by the millions they hold a
lesser claim to access food, shelter, income, education, and medical care. Turkey must
reevaluate the provisions offered conditional refugees and ensure that food, shelter,
medical care, income, and education will be guaranteed.
Right now, ninety percent of Turkey’s refugees are working in the informal
sector.241 If migrants cannot work for the first six months of their stay, they must at least
have access to cash assistance that is sufficient to afford rent, transportation, food and
basic necessities. If not, irregular work will continue and competition for low wage, low
skill jobs will keep on affecting the experiences of citizens and non-citizens alike. Only
allowing migrants to work for employers that have more citizens than non citizens further
encourages irregular work. It also disproportionately affects migrants, who already have
trouble finding safe, regular work and bars them from working for small-scale employers.
Migrants in Turkey are denied freedom of movement, a right offered by the 1951
Refugee Convention. Restrictions to movement, which prevent access to opportunity,
safety, and resources, encourages informal work, irregular residence, and other violations
to the conditions of one’s stay. In other words, the Turkish government is causing forced
criminality. Migrants are set up for failure when they must choose between remaining in
satellite cities or pursuing basic resources and safety. Freedom of movement is essential
for social mobility, integration and reducing arrests.
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The Turkish authorities also must support civil society, response personnel, and
local authorities, particularly in large cities, to reduce strain on public services and
increase the country’s capacity to respond to the incredible amount of displaced people.
Political actors should also realize the repercussions of anti-migrant campaign platforms
as they only create further societal fragmentation. Politicians will only lose support if
they continue to neglect public institutions, to the detriment of their constituents.
Purposefully preventing integration will do nothing for national growth or community
cohesion and public institutions will remain weak. Instead, Turkey should increase civil
society participation in its integration and outreach efforts and equip these groups to
make their work more effective.
The provisions outlined in the LFIP are useless if they are unobtainable. Enrolling
children in school should be made easy. Barriers to information and complicated
procedures should not be used as a tool to keep attendance low. Transport to registration
centers should be facilitated so as to reduce the need for smugglers. Personal
identification cards (kimlik) should be distributed immediately upon registration so that
migrants can access health care and enroll their children in school.
Migration to Turkey is a long term and perhaps permanent phenomenon. It should
not be treated as a temporary issue or a brief humanitarian emergency. By failing to
support migrants, the Turkish government is failing to support society as a whole.
Purposefully marginalizing displaced people will only cause economic chaos, crime,
unregistered populations, social fragmentation, and life threatening conditions for
migrants. Each of these factors are sources of transit migration to Europe, yet the
increased border security that came with the EU-Turkey deal forces migrants into the
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hands of smugglers. Therefore, stopping irregular migration and smuggling to Europe
requires Turkey to protect migrants and equip them for success and integration, and a
realistic opportunity to seek asylum in third countries.

VI. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

I do not deny that border and population surveillance are important for national
security. However, they should be balanced with a humanitarian migration strategy that
upholds human rights and the safety of migrants. The European Union identity is
grounded in protecting human rights. For this reason, Member States should take border
security abuses seriously. Creating the EU was a post WWII project against fascism and
xenophobia, yet in its treatment of asylum seekers, political leaders are returning to the
very principles it so vehemently condemns. As I have repeatedly demonstrated, crossing
borders to seek refuge from persecution is not a crime, yet current approaches to
smuggling and irregular cross-border movement criminalize migrants, with direct impacts
on mental and physical health and the ability to claim rights. Operations Triton, Poseidon
and EUNAVFOR MED each demonstrated a conscious decision to switch from search
and rescue to border security after leadership saw that search and rescue, while saving
lives, did not stop migration. In doing so they denied thousands of migrants their right to
seek asylum, to life, and to not be returned to dangerous territory.
When addressing irregular arrivals, the crime of smuggling must be separated
from the immediate and long-term needs of the victim. It is imperative that states adopt a
less militarized response to migration and prioritize protecting the rights of migrants. Not
only are militarized border controls and restrictive immigration policies ineffective
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responses for stopping irregular migration and smuggling, they harm migrants and
empower larger criminal syndicates and traffickers within the smuggling industry.
Member States must hold themselves accountable to the principles their regime was
founded on and adopt a rights based, humanitarian perspective. Smuggled migrants must
be treated as a population in need of protection and immediate aid, both as a result of the
conditions of their flight and for any additional traumas that have taken place during their
journey.
It is crucial that response personnel keep in mind that each case is unique and
complex and therefore a comprehensive evaluation is necessary. Maritime surveillance
should be equally dedicated to search and rescue with enough personnel readily available
for deployment in case of emergency. Their mission should be to seek out distressed
vessels in order to limit the time migrants are on the water and therefore reduce fatalities.
Border agents should be held accountable for their treatment of migrants and monitoring
and reporting systems should be in place to reduce corruption and abuse. Conditions in
camps and transit areas must be improved to prioritize the safety of residents and provide
access to essential resources such as shelter, food, water, medical care, electricity,
sanitation facilities, clear and transparent access to crucial information, and legal advice
and protection.
If the EU wishes to remain the EU it must reverse this speedy shift towards
ultranationalism, xenophobia, and fascism, which are acted out through violent and
discriminatory practices and policies. Such actions are not only politically illegitimate
and morally unsound, they are an existential threat to the European Union, which was
constructed in response to similar conditions in WWII. If the conversation does not shift
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from keeping migrants out to upholding the rights frameworks leaders and their
predecessors have constructed and are accountable to, the European Union is
undermining its very existence.
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